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Number of items at this level: 58.

A

Alonso, Ricardo ORCID: 0000-0001-9559-0864 and Rantakari, Heikki (2014) The art of brevity. USC Marshall School of Business Research Paper Series. University of Southern California, Marshall School of Business, Los Angeles, CA, USA.

Alonso, Ricardo ORCID: 0000-0001-9559-0864 and Rantakari, Heikki (2022) The art of brevity. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 195. 257 - 271. ISSN 0167-2681

Alpern, Steve, Gal, Shmuel and Solan, Eilon (2010) A sequential selection game with vetoes. Games and Economic Behavior, 68 (1). pp. 1-14. ISSN 0899-8256

Alpern, Steven, Morton, Alec and Papadaki, Katerina ORCID: 0000-0002-0755-1281 (2011) Patrolling games. Operations Research, 59 (5). pp. 1246-1257. ISSN 0030-364X

Andersson, Ola, Galizzi, Matteo M. ORCID: 0000-0002-7757-5625, Hoppe, Tim, Kranz, Sebastian, der Wiel, Karen van and Wengström, Erik (2010) Persuasion in experimental ultimatum games. Economics Letters, 108 (1). pp. 16-18. ISSN 0165-1765

Anthropelos, Michail and Kardaras, Constantinos ORCID: 0000-0001-6903-4506 (2017) Equilibrium in risk-sharing games. Finance and Stochastics, 21 (3). pp. 815-865. ISSN 0949-2984

B

Barrdear, John (2014) Peering into the mist: social learning over an opaque observation network. CFM discussion paper series (CFM-DP2014-9). Centre For Macroeconomics, London, UK.

Bergemann, Dirk and Pesendorfer, Martin ORCID: 0000-0002-0547-8711 (2007) Information structures in optimal auctions. Journal of Economic Theory, 137 (1). pp. 580-609. ISSN 1095-7235

Bergemann, Dirk and Pesendorfer, Martin ORCID: 0000-0002-0547-8711 (2001) Information structures in optimal auctions. . Centre for Economic Policy Research (Great Britain), London, UK.

Binmore, Ken G, Shaked, Avner and Sutton, John (1985) Testing non-cooperative bargaining theory: a preliminary study. American Economic Review, 75 (5). pp. 1178-1180. ISSN 0002-8282

Binmore, Ken G, Shaked, Avner and Sutton, John (1988) A further test of non-cooperative bargaining theory: reply. American Economic Review, 78 (4). pp. 837-839. ISSN 0002-8282

Brañas-Garza, Pablo, Chowdhury, Subhasish M., Espín, Antonio M. and Nieboer, Jeroen (2023) Born this way? Prenatal exposure to testosterone may determine behavior in competition and conflict. Journal of Economic Psychology, 96. ISSN 0167-4870

C

Carletti, Elena (2001) The structure of bank relationships, endogenous monitoring and loan rates. Financial Markets Group Discussion Papers (388). Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.

Cartwright, Edward J. and Mirza, Zarak (2021) Charitable giving when donors are constrained to give a minimum amount. Oxford Economic Papers, 73 (1). 295 - 316. ISSN 0030-7653

Caselli, Francesco ORCID: 0009-0001-5191-7156 and Coleman, Wilbur John (2013) On the theory of ethnic conflict. Journal of the European Economic Association, 11 (S1). pp. 161-192. ISSN 1542-4766

Chassang, Sylvain and Padró i Miquel, Gerard (2008) Conflict and deterrence under strategic risk. NBER working papers (13964). NBER, Cambridge, USA.

Cole, Richard, Correa, Jose, Gkatzelis, Vasillis, Mirrokni, Vahab and Olver, Neil ORCID: 0000-0001-8897-5459 (2015) Decentralized utilitarian mechanisms for scheduling games. Games and Economic Behavior, 92. 306 - 326. ISSN 0899-8256

Cole, Richard, Correa, Jose, Gkatzelis, Vasillis, Mirrokni, Vahab and Olver, Neil ORCID: 0000-0001-8897-5459 (2011) Decentralized utilitarian mechanisms for scheduling games. In: 43rd ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, 2011-06-06 - 2011-06-08, San Jose, California, San Jose, United States, USA.

D

Dasgupta, Amil ORCID: 0000-0001-8474-9470, Steiner, Jakub and Stewart, Colin (2012) Dynamic coordination with individual learning. Games and Economic Behavior, 74 (1). pp. 83-101. ISSN 0899-8256 (Submitted)

Dasgupta, Amil ORCID: 0000-0001-8474-9470, Steiner, Jakub and Stewart, Colin (2007) Efficient dynamic coordination with individual learning. Financial Markets Group Discussion Papers (600). Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.

E

Eliaz, Kfir, Spiegler, Ran and Thysen, Heidi C. (2021) Strategic interpretations. Journal of Economic Theory, 192. ISSN 0022-0531

Engel, Stefanie, López, Ramón and Palmer, Charles ORCID: 0000-0002-1252-179X (2006) Community-industry contracting over natural resource use in a context of weak property rights: the case of Indonesia. Environmental and Resource Economics, 33 (1). pp. 73-93. ISSN 0924-6460

Eyster, Erik (2007) Party platforms in electoral competition with heterogeneous constituencies. Theoretical Economics, 2. pp. 41-70. ISSN 1933-6837

F

Frantz, Pascal ORCID: 0009-0005-3394-0589, Instefjord, Norvald and Walker, Martin (2007) Executive compensation contracts: a model of disclosure choice. . Social Science Research Network.

G

Gong, Rui, Page, Frank and Wooders, Myrna (2015) Endogenous correlated network dynamics. Systemic Risk Centre Discussion Papers (39). Systemic Risk Centre, The London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.

Gossner, Olivier ORCID: 0000-0003-3950-0208 (2010) Ability and knowledge. Games and Economic Behavior, 69 (1). pp. 95-106. ISSN 0899-8256

Gossner, Olivier ORCID: 0000-0003-3950-0208 and Hörner, Johannes (2010) When is the lowest equilibrium payoff in a repeated game equal to the minmax payoff? Journal of Economic Theory, 145 (1). pp. 63-84. ISSN 1095-7235

H

Hajivassiliou, Vassilis ORCID: 0009-0000-7041-0791 (2019) Switching regressions with imperfect regime classification information: theory and applications. STICERD Econometrics Papers (610). Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, London, UK.

Heinemann, Frank, Nagel, Rosemarie and Ockenfels, Peter (2002) Speculative attacks and financial architecture: experimental analysis of coordination games with public and private information. Financial Markets Group Discussion Papers (416). Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.

Hortala-Vallve, Rafael ORCID: 0000-0002-9677-497X (2011) Generous legislators?: a description of vote trading agreements. Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 6 (2). pp. 179-196. ISSN 1554-0626

Hortala-Vallve, Rafael ORCID: 0000-0002-9677-497X (2006) Qualitative voting. Economics Series Working Papers (320). Department of Economics, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK.

Hortala-Vallve, Rafael ORCID: 0000-0002-9677-497X (2012) Qualitative voting. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 24 (4). pp. 526-554. ISSN 0951-6298

Hortala-Vallve, Rafael ORCID: 0000-0002-9677-497X and Llorente-Saguer, Aniol (2010) Pure strategy Nash equilibria in non-zero sum Colonel Blotto games. . London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.

Hortala-Vallve, Rafael ORCID: 0000-0002-9677-497X and Llorente-Saguer, Aniol (2012) Pure strategy Nash equilibria in non-zero sum colonel Blotto games. International Journal of Game Theory, 41 (2). pp. 331-343. ISSN 0020-7276

I

Isaksen, Elisabeth Thuestad ORCID: 0000-0002-6557-8001, Brekke, Kjell Arne and Richter, Andries (2019) Positive framing does not solve the tragedy of the commons. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 95. pp. 45-56. ISSN 0095-0696

K

Kirchsteiger, Georg and Prat, Andrea (2001) Inefficient equilibria in lobbying. Journal of Public Economics, 82 (3). pp. 349-375. ISSN 0047-2727

L

Li, Ming and Madarász, Kristóf ORCID: 0009-0008-8053-3937 (2008) When mandatory disclosure hurts: expert advice and conflicting interests. Journal of Economic Theory, 139 (1). pp. 47-74. ISSN 1095-7235

N

Naroditskiy, Victor and Steinberg, Richard ORCID: 0000-0001-9636-472X (2015) Maximizing social welfare in congestion games via redistribution. Games and Economic Behavior, 93. pp. 24-41. ISSN 0899-8256

Nava, Francesco ORCID: 0009-0008-9593-3650 and Piccione, Michele (2014) Efficiency in repeated games with local interaction and uncertain local monitoring. Theoretical Economics, 9 (1). pp. 279-312. ISSN 1933-6837

Nax, Heinrich H. and Rigos, Alexandros (2015) Assortativity evolving from social dilemmas. . Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule Zürich, Zurich, Switzerland.

O

Ornelas, Emanuel ORCID: 0000-0001-8330-8745 and Turner, John L. (2007) Efficient dissolution of partnerships and the structure of control. Games and Economic Behavior, 60 (1). pp. 187-199. ISSN 0899-8256

Otsu, Taisuke ORCID: 0000-0002-2307-143X, Pesendorfer, Martin ORCID: 0000-0002-0547-8711 and Takahashi, Yuya (2016) Pooling data across markets in dynamic Markov games. Quantitative Economics, 7 (2). 523 - 559. ISSN 1759-7323

Otsu, Taisuke ORCID: 0000-0002-2307-143X, Pesendorfer, Martin ORCID: 0000-0002-0547-8711 and Takahashi, Yuya (2013) Testing for equilibrium multiplicity in dynamic Markov games. Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (423).

P

Peretz, Ron (2012) The strategic value of recall. Games and Economic Behavior, 74 (1). pp. 332-351. ISSN 0899-8256

Peretz, Ron and Bavly, Gilad (2014) How to gamble against all odds. Games and Economic Behavior. ISSN 0899-8256 (Submitted)

Portugal, Adriana Cuoco and Bugarin, Maurício (2007) Electoral campaign financing: the role of public contributions and party ideology. Economía, 8 (1). 143 - 171. ISSN 1529-7470

Prat, Andrea and Rustichini, A. (1998) Sequential common agency. . Center for Economic Research, Tilburg University, Tilburg, The Netherlands.

R

Roberts, Kevin (1999) Dynamic voting in clubs. TE (367). Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, London, UK.

S

Sanchez-Villalba, Miguel (2006) Anti-evasion auditing policy in the presence of common income shocks. DARP (80). Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, London, UK.

T

Tavoni, Alessandro ORCID: 0000-0002-2057-5720 (2009) Incorporating fairness motives and quantal response equilibrium concepts: an application to 2x2 games. In: 14th Coalition Theory Network workshop, 2009-01-23 - 2009-01-24, Maastricht, Netherlands, NLD. (Submitted)

Tavoni, Alessandro ORCID: 0000-0002-2057-5720 (2008) The role of fairness motives and spatial considerations in explaining departures from Nash equilibrium: stationary and evolutionary lessons from 2x2 games. In: EAERE-FEEM-VIU European Summer School "Space in unified models of economy and ecology", 2008-07-06 - 2008-07-12, Venice, Italy, ITA. (Submitted)

V

von Stengel, Bernhard ORCID: 0000-0002-3488-8322 (2003) Follower payoffs in symmetric duopoly games. CDAM research report series (LSE-CDAM-2003-13). Centre for Discrete and Applicable Mathematics, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.

von Stengel, Bernhard ORCID: 0000-0002-3488-8322 (2010) Follower payoffs in symmetric duopoly games. Games and Economic Behavior, 69 (2). pp. 512-516. ISSN 0899-8256

von Stengel, Bernhard ORCID: 0000-0002-3488-8322 (2016) Recursive inspection games. Mathematics of Operations Research, 41 (3). pp. 935-952. ISSN 0364-765X

von Stengel, Bernhard ORCID: 0000-0002-3488-8322 and Zamir, Schmuel (2004) Leadership with commitment to mixed strategies. CDAM research report series (LSE-CDAM-2004-01). Centre for Discrete and Applicable Mathematics, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.

von Stengel, Bernhard ORCID: 0000-0002-3488-8322 and Zamir, Shmuel (2010) Leadership games with convex strategy sets. Games and Economic Behavior, 69 (2). pp. 446-457. ISSN 0899-8256

W

Weizsacker, Georg (2008) Do we follow others when we should? A simple test of rational expectations. . ESRC Centre for Economic Learning and Social Evolution, University College London, London, UK.

İ

İriş, D., Lee, J. and Tavoni, A. ORCID: 0000-0002-2057-5720 (2019) Delegation and public pressure in a threshold public goods game. Environmental and Resource Economics, 74 (3). 1331 - 1353. ISSN 0924-6460

This list was generated on Thu Dec 19 10:29:27 2024 GMT.