Nax, Heinrich H. and Rigos, Alexandros (2015) Assortativity evolving from social dilemmas. . Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule Zürich, Zurich, Switzerland.
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Abstract
Assortative mechanisms can overcome tragedies of the commons that otherwise result in dilemma situations. Assortativity criteria include genetics (e.g. kin selection), preferences (e.g. homophily), locations (e.g. spatial interaction) and actions (e.g. meritocracy), usually presuming an exogenously fixed matching mechanism. Here, we endogenize the matching process with the aim of investigating how assortativity itself, jointly with cooperation, is driven by evolution. Our main finding is that only full-or-null assortativities turn out to be long-run stable, their relative stabilities depending on the exact incentive structure of the underlying social dilemma. The resulting social loss is evaluated for general classes of dilemma games, thus quantifying to what extent tragedy of the commons may be endogenously overcome.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Working Paper) |
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| Official URL: | https://www.gess.ethz.ch/en/ |
| Additional Information: | © 2015 The Authors |
| Divisions: | CPNSS |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > H Social Sciences (General) Q Science > QA Mathematics |
| JEL classification: | C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C6 - Mathematical Methods and Programming > C62 - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games Z - Other Special Topics > Z0 - General |
| Date Deposited: | 22 Feb 2016 12:18 |
| Last Modified: | 26 Mar 2024 12:27 |
| URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/65447 |
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