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Inefficient equilibria in lobbying

Kirchsteiger, Georg and Prat, Andrea (2001) Inefficient equilibria in lobbying. Journal of Public Economics, 82 (3). pp. 349-375. ISSN 0047-2727

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Identification Number: 10.1016/S0047-2727(00)00134-1
Item Type: Article
Official URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/00472...
Additional Information: © 2001 Elsevier Science B.V.
Divisions: Economics
STICERD
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
JEL classification: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C9 - Design of Experiments > C92 - Laboratory, Group Behavior
D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games
Date Deposited: 03 Apr 2008 11:08
Last Modified: 21 Mar 2021 00:10
URI: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/4077

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