Library Header Image
LSE Research Online LSE Library Services

Inefficient equilibria in lobbying

Kirchsteiger, Georg and Prat, Andrea (2001) Inefficient equilibria in lobbying. Journal of Public Economics, 82 (3). pp. 349-375. ISSN 0047-2727

Full text not available from this repository.

Item Type: Article
Official URL:
Additional Information: © 2001 Elsevier Science B.V.
Library of Congress subject classification: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Journal of Economic Literature Classification System: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C9 - Design of Experiments > C92 - Laboratory, Group Behavior
D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games
Sets: Collections > Economists Online
Departments > Economics
Research centres and groups > Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines (STICERD)
Date Deposited: 03 Apr 2008 11:08

Actions (login required)

Record administration - authorised staff only Record administration - authorised staff only