Inefficient equilibria in lobbying

Kirchsteiger, Georg and Prat, Andrea (2001) Inefficient equilibria in lobbying. Journal of public economics, 82 (3). pp. 349-375. ISSN 0047-2727

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Item Type:	Article
Official URL:	http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/00472...
Additional Information:	© 2001 Elsevier Science B.V.
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Inefficiencies in lobbying; Common agency; Truthful equilibrium; Natural equilibrium
Library of Congress subject classification:	H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Journal of Economic Literature Classification System:	C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C9 - Design of Experiments > C92 - Laboratory, Group Behavior D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games
Sets:	Collections > Economists Online Departments > Economics Research centres and groups > Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines (STICERD)
Rights:	http://www.lse.ac.uk/library/rights/LSERO.htm
URL:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/4077/

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