Dynamic voting in clubs

Roberts, Kevin (1999) Dynamic voting in clubs. TE, 367. Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.

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Abstract

This paper examines the process and outcomes of democratic decision-making in clubs where a club is defined by their sets of members whose preferences and decisions relate to the set of members in the club: the electorate to endogenous. Examples range from international organizations like the European Union and NATO to firms, workers' cooperatives and trade unions. Although the policy space is infinite, a majority voting equilibrium exists under plausible conditions and the equilibrium rule and the dynamics of clubs are characterised. Two types of club, one where a group funds some public good and the other where a given benefit is shared by the group, are analysed in detail.

Item Type:	Monograph (Discussion Paper)
Official URL:	http://sticerd.lse.ac.uk
Additional Information:	© 1999 Kevin Roberts
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Cooperatives; local public goods; majority voting; median voter; organization size; partnerships; trade unions
Library of Congress subject classification:	H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor H Social Sciences > HV Social pathology. Social and public welfare. Criminology
Journal of Economic Literature Classification System:	C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games H - Public Economics > H4 - Publicly Provided Goods > H41 - Public Goods D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations L - Industrial Organization > L2 - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior > L20 - General D - Microeconomics > D9 - Intertemporal Choice and Growth > D92 - Intertemporal Firm Choice and Growth, Investment, or Financing
Sets:	Collections > Economists Online Research centres and groups > Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines (STICERD)
Rights:	http://www.lse.ac.uk/library/rights/LSERO.htm
Identification Number:	367
URL:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/19349/

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