von Stengel, Bernhard (2003) Follower payoffs in symmetric duopoly games. CDAM research report series, LSE-CDAM-2003-13. Centre for Discrete and Applicable Mathematics, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.Full text not available from this repository.
This paper compares the leader and follower payoffs in a duopoly game, as they arise in sequential play, with the Nash payoffs in simultaneous play. If the game is symmetric, has a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium, and players’ payoffs are monotonic in the opponent’s choice along their own best reply function, then the follower payoff is either higher than the leader payoff, or lower than even in the simultaneous game. As a possible interpretation, endogenous timing in such games is difficult since the players either want to move both second or both first.
|Item Type:||Monograph (Report)|
|Additional Information:||© 2003 the author|
|Uncontrolled Keywords:||Cournot, duopoly game, endogenous timing, follower, leader, Stackelberg, strategic complements, strategic substitutes.|
|Library of Congress subject classification:||Q Science > QA Mathematics|
|Journal of Economic Literature Classification System:||L - Industrial Organization > L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance > L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games
D - Microeconomics > D4 - Market Structure and Pricing > D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
|Sets:||Departments > Mathematics
Research centres and groups > Computational, Discrete and Applicable Mathematics@LSE (CDAM)
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