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When is the lowest equilibrium payoff in a repeated game equal to the minmax payoff?

Gossner, Olivier and Hörner, Johannes (2010) When is the lowest equilibrium payoff in a repeated game equal to the minmax payoff? Journal of Economic Theory, 145 (1). pp. 63-84. ISSN 1095-7235

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Abstract

We study the relationship between a player's lowest equilibrium payoff in a repeated game with imperfect monitoring and this player's minmax payoff in the corresponding one-shot game. We characterize the signal structures under which these two payoffs coincide for any payoff matrix. Under an identifiability assumption, we further show that, if the monitoring structure of an infinitely repeated game “nearly” satisfies this condition, then these two payoffs are approximately equal, independently of the discount factor. This provides conditions under which existing folk theorems exactly characterize the limiting payoff set.

Item Type: Article
Official URL: http://jet.arts.cornell.edu/Main.html
Additional Information: © 2009 Elsevier Inc.
Library of Congress subject classification: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Journal of Economic Literature Classification System: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games
D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
Sets: Departments > Mathematics
Collections > Economists Online
Rights: http://www.lse.ac.uk/library/usingTheLibrary/academicSupport/OA/depositYourResearch.aspx
Date Deposited: 30 Mar 2010 14:12
URL: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/27625/

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