Isaksen, Elisabeth Thuestad ORCID: 0000-0002-6557-8001, Brekke, Kjell Arne and Richter, Andries (2019) Positive framing does not solve the tragedy of the commons. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 95. pp. 45-56. ISSN 0095-0696
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Abstract
We investigate whether positive framing increases cooperation in three social dilemmas with slightly different properties: a linear public goods (PG) game, a non-linear PG game, and a common pool resource (CPR) game. Results from our laboratory experiments show that contributions to a linear PG are higher if the externality is framed positively, rather than negatively, corroborating earlier findings by Andreoni (1995). By contrast, we find no such framing effects in the non-linear PG game or the CPR game. In these games, the best response in the material payoffs is to contribute less if others contribute more, counteracting effects of pro-social preferences. Positive framing therefore does not help to solve the tragedy of the commons.
Item Type: | Article |
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Official URL: | https://www.journals.elsevier.com/journal-of-envir... |
Additional Information: | © 2018 Elsevier B.V. |
Divisions: | Grantham Research Institute |
Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor > HD28 Management. Industrial Management |
JEL classification: | C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C9 - Design of Experiments > C92 - Laboratory, Group Behavior D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D70 - General |
Date Deposited: | 19 Nov 2018 15:20 |
Last Modified: | 21 Sep 2024 22:30 |
URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/90607 |
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