Maximizing social welfare in congestion games via redistribution

Naroditskiy, Victor and Steinberg, Richard (2015) Maximizing social welfare in congestion games via redistribution. Games and Economic Behavior, 93 . pp. 24-41. ISSN 0899-8256

PDF - Accepted Version Restricted to Repository staff only until 11 January 2017. Download (496Kb)

• LSE expert's profile

• Published item via DOI

Abstract

It is well-known that efficient use of congestible resources can be achieved via marginal pricing; however, payments collected from the agents generate a budget surplus, which reduces social welfare. We show that an asymptotically first-best solution in the number of agents can be achieved by the appropriate redistribution of the budget surplus back to the agents.

Item Type:	Article
Official URL:	http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/08998...
Additional Information:	© 2015 Elsevier Inc.
Library of Congress subject classification:	H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions Q Science > QA Mathematics
Journal of Economic Literature Classification System:	C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
Sets:	Research centres and groups > Public Management Group Collections > Economists Online
Date Deposited:	20 Jul 2015 11:11
URL:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/62771/

Actions (login required)

Record administration - authorised staff only