Cookies?
Library Header Image
LSE Research Online LSE Library Services

Patrolling games

Alpern, Steven, Morton, Alec and Papadaki, Katerina (2011) Patrolling games. Operations Research, 59 (5). pp. 1246-1257. ISSN 0030-364X

Full text not available from this repository.

Abstract

A key operational problem for those charged with the security of vulnerable facilities (such as airports or art galleries) is the scheduling and deployment of patrols. Motivated by the problem of optimizing randomized, and thus unpredictable, patrols, we present a class of patrolling games. The facility to be patrolled can be thought of as a network or graph Q of interconnected nodes (e.g., rooms, terminals), and the Attacker can choose to attack any node of Q within a given time T . He requires m consecutive periods there, uninterrupted by the Patroller, to commit his nefarious act (and win). The Patroller can follow any path on the graph. Thus, the patrolling game is a win-lose game, where the Value is the probability that the Patroller successfully intercepts an attack, given best play on both sides. We determine analytically either the Value of the game, or bounds on the Value, for various classes of graphs, and we discuss possible extensions and generalizations. Subject classifications: games; noncooperative; military, search/surveillance; decision analysis; risk; networks/graphs. Area of review: Military and Homeland Security. History: Received November 2009; revisions received March 2010, September 2010; accepted November 2010

Item Type: Article
Official URL: http://or.journal.informs.org/
Additional Information: © 2011 Insitute for operations research and the management sciences (INFORMS)research
Library of Congress subject classification: Q Science > QA Mathematics
U Military Science > U Military Science (General)
Journal of Economic Literature Classification System: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C0 - General > C02 - Mathematical Methods
C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games
Sets: Research centres and groups > Management Science Group
Departments > Mathematics
Departments > Management
Collections > Economists Online
Research centres and groups > LSE Health
Rights: http://www.lse.ac.uk/library/usingTheLibrary/academicSupport/OA/depositYourResearch.aspx
Date Deposited: 07 Feb 2011 14:39
URL: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/32210/

Actions (login required)

Record administration - authorised staff only Record administration - authorised staff only