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Pure strategy Nash equilibria in non-zero sum colonel Blotto games

Hortala-Vallve, Rafael and Llorente-Saguer, Aniol (2012) Pure strategy Nash equilibria in non-zero sum colonel Blotto games. International Journal of Game Theory, 41 (2). pp. 331-343. ISSN 0020-7276

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Identification Number: 10.1007/s00182-011-0288-4

Abstract

We analyze a Colonel Blotto game in which opposing parties have differing relative intensities. In other words, the game is non-zero sum because colonels have asymmetric and heterogeneous battlefield valuations. We characterize the colonels' payoffs that sustain a pure strategy equilibrium and present an algorithm that reaches the equilibrium actions (when they exist). Finally we show that the set of games with a pure strategy equilibria is non-empty.

Item Type: Article
Official URL: http://www.springer.com/economics/economic+theory/...
Additional Information: © 2012 Springer-Verlag.
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HA Statistics
Sets: Departments > Government
Date Deposited: 04 May 2012 08:50
Last Modified: 04 May 2012 08:50
URI: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/43395

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