Hortala-Vallve, Rafael and Llorente-Saguer, Aniol (2012) Pure strategy Nash equilibria in non-zero sum colonel Blotto games. International Journal of Game Theory, 41 (2). pp. 331-343. ISSN 0020-7276
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Identification Number: 10.1007/s00182-011-0288-4
Abstract
We analyze a Colonel Blotto game in which opposing parties have differing relative intensities. In other words, the game is non-zero sum because colonels have asymmetric and heterogeneous battlefield valuations. We characterize the colonels' payoffs that sustain a pure strategy equilibrium and present an algorithm that reaches the equilibrium actions (when they exist). Finally we show that the set of games with a pure strategy equilibria is non-empty.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | http://www.springer.com/economics/economic+theory/... |
| Additional Information: | © 2012 Springer-Verlag. |
| Divisions: | Government |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HA Statistics |
| JEL classification: | C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games |
| Date Deposited: | 04 May 2012 08:50 |
| Last Modified: | 13 Apr 2024 16:24 |
| URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/43395 |
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