Dasgupta, Amil, Steiner, Jakub and Stewart, Colin (2012) Dynamic coordination with individual learning. Games and Economic Behavior, 74 (1). pp. 83-101. ISSN 0899-8256
Abstract
We study coordination in dynamic global games with private learning. Players choose whether and when to invest irreversibly in a project whose success depends on its quality and the timing of investment. Players gradually learn about project quality. We identify conditions on temporal incentives under which, in sufficiently long games, players coordinate on investing whenever doing so is not dominated. Roughly speaking, this outcome occurs whenever playersʼ payoffs are sufficiently tolerant of non-simultaneous coordination. We also identify conditions under which players coordinate on the risk-dominant action. We provide foundations for these results in terms of higher order beliefs.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | http://www.elsevier.com/wps/find/journaldescriptio... |
| Additional Information: | © 2012 Elsevier |
| Library of Congress subject classification: | H Social Sciences > HG Finance |
| Journal of Economic Literature Classification System: | C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D83 - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief |
| Sets: | Departments > Finance Collections > Economists Online |
| Date Deposited: | 28 Nov 2012 11:54 |
| URL: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/37362/ |
Actions (login required)
 |
Record administration - authorised staff only |
