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Charitable giving when donors are constrained to give a minimum amount

Cartwright, Edward J. and Mirza, Zarak (2021) Charitable giving when donors are constrained to give a minimum amount. Oxford Economic Papers, 73 (1). 295 - 316. ISSN 0030-7653

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Identification Number: 10.1093/oep/gpz063


In some instances charities insist on donors giving more than a minimum amount. In other instances charities frame appeals for funds in a way that suggests there is a minimum donation. So, what are the effects on charitable giving if a minimum donation is required? We first provide a simple theoretical model that shows the effects are ambiguous. We then report the results of two lab experiments that consider very different settings. In the first experiment the only incentive to give is intrinsic motivation. Here we find that a minimum constraint lowers giving. The second experiment involves group interaction with extrinsic incentives to give. Here we find that a minimum constraint increases giving. Our results suggest that the effects of a minimum constraint may depend critically on the mix of intrinsic and extrinsic incentives.

Item Type: Article
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Additional Information: © 2019 Oxford University Press. All rights reserved.
Divisions: Economics
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HV Social pathology. Social and public welfare. Criminology
H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
JEL classification: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games
H - Public Economics > H4 - Publicly Provided Goods > H41 - Public Goods
Date Deposited: 30 Mar 2022 16:30
Last Modified: 16 May 2024 03:41

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