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Information structures in optimal auctions

Bergemann, Dirk and Pesendorfer, Martin (2001) Information structures in optimal auctions. 2991. Centre for Economic Policy Research, London, UK.

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Identification Number: 2991

Abstract

A seller wishes to sell an object to one of multiple bidders. The valuations of the bidders are privately known. We consider the joint design problem in which the seller can decide the accuracy by which bidders learn their valuation and to whom to sell at what price. We establish that optimal information structures in an optimal auction exhibit a number of properties: (i) information structures can be represented by monotone partitions; (ii) the cardinality of each partition is finite; (iii) the partitions are asymmetric across agents. These properties imply that the optimal selling strategy of a seller can be implemented by a sequence of exclusive take-it-or-leave-it offers.

Item Type: Monograph (Discussion Paper)
Official URL: http://www.cepr.org
Additional Information: © 2001 Dirk Bergemann and Martin Pesendorfer
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Sets: Collections > Economists Online
Departments > Economics
Research centres and groups > Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines (STICERD)
Date Deposited: 20 May 2008 10:06
Last Modified: 01 Oct 2010 08:54
URI: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/4913

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