Efficiency in repeated games with local interaction and uncertain local monitoring

Nava, Francesco and Piccione, Michele (2014) Efficiency in repeated games with local interaction and uncertain local monitoring. Theoretical Economics, 9 (1). pp. 279-312. ISSN 1933-6837

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Abstract

This paper discusses community enforcement in infinitely repeated, two-action games with local interaction and uncertain monitoring. Each player interacts with and observes only a fixed set of opponents, of whom he is privately informed. The main result shows that when beliefs about the monitoring structure have full support, efficiency can be sustained with sequential equilibria that are independent of the players' beliefs. Stronger results are obtained when only acyclic monitoring structures are allowed or players have unit discount rates. These equilibria satisfy numerous robustness properties.

Item Type:	Article
Official URL:	http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/%28...
Additional Information:	© 2014 The Authors © CC BY-NC 3.0
Divisions:	Economics
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory Q Science > QA Mathematics
JEL classification:	C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D85 - Network Formation and Analysis: Theory
Date Deposited:	24 Mar 2014 09:18
Last Modified:	05 Apr 2024 00:09
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/56218

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