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Pure strategy Nash equilibria in non-zero sum Colonel Blotto games

Hortala-Vallve, Rafael and Llorente-Saguer, Aniol (2010) Pure strategy Nash equilibria in non-zero sum Colonel Blotto games. London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK. (Unpublished)

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Abstract

We analyse a Colonel Blotto game in which opposing parties have differing relative intensities (i.e. the game is non-zero sum). We characterize the colonels. Payoffs that sustain a pure strategy equilibrium and present an algorithm that reaches the equilibrium actions (when they exist). Finally we show that the set of games with a pure strategy equilibria is non-empty.

Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
Official URL: http://personal.lse.ac.uk/hortalav/DEFAULT_files/C...
Additional Information: © 2010 The Authors
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Sets: Departments > Government
Collections > Economists Online
Date Deposited: 20 Jul 2010 12:41
Last Modified: 18 May 2011 09:52
URI: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/28693

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