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Pure strategy Nash equilibria in non-zero sum Colonel Blotto games

Hortala-Vallve, Rafael and Llorente-Saguer, Aniol (2010) Pure strategy Nash equilibria in non-zero sum Colonel Blotto games. . London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.

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We analyse a Colonel Blotto game in which opposing parties have differing relative intensities (i.e. the game is non-zero sum). We characterize the colonels. Payoffs that sustain a pure strategy equilibrium and present an algorithm that reaches the equilibrium actions (when they exist). Finally we show that the set of games with a pure strategy equilibria is non-empty.

Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
Official URL:
Additional Information: © 2010 The Authors
Divisions: Government
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
JEL classification: D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games
P - Economic Systems > P1 - Capitalist Systems > P16 - Political Economy
Date Deposited: 20 Jul 2010 12:41
Last Modified: 30 Jan 2021 00:22

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