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Persuasion in experimental ultimatum games

Andersson, Ola and Galizzi, Matteo M. and Hoppe, Tim and Kranz, Sebastian and der Wiel, Karen van and Wengström, Erik (2010) Persuasion in experimental ultimatum games. Economics Letters, 108 (1). pp. 16-18. ISSN 0165-1765

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Identification Number: 10.1016/j.econlet.2010.03.011

Abstract

We study persuasion effects in experimental ultimatum games and find that Proposers' payoffs significantly increase if, along with offers, they can send messages which Responders read before deciding. Higher payoffs are driven by both lower offers and higher acceptance rates.

Item Type: Article
Official URL: http://www.journals.elsevier.com/economics-letters...
Additional Information: © 2010 Elsevier
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HV Social pathology. Social and public welfare. Criminology
JEL classification: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games
C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C9 - Design of Experiments > C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D83 - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief
Sets: Departments > Social Policy
Research centres and groups > LSE Health and Social Care
Date Deposited: 19 Feb 2015 15:47
Last Modified: 19 Feb 2015 15:47
Projects: PRIN 2007ATXXJ3, SFB/TR 15
Funders: Wallander-Hedelius foundation, MIUR, MaxLab, Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, CentER at Tilburg University
URI: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/61010

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