Andersson, Ola, Galizzi, Matteo M., Hoppe, Tim, Kranz, Sebastian, der Wiel, Karen van and Wengström, Erik (2010) Persuasion in experimental ultimatum games. Economics Letters, 108 (1). pp. 16-18. ISSN 0165-1765
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Identification Number: 10.1016/j.econlet.2010.03.011
Abstract
We study persuasion effects in experimental ultimatum games and find that Proposers' payoffs significantly increase if, along with offers, they can send messages which Responders read before deciding. Higher payoffs are driven by both lower offers and higher acceptance rates.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | http://www.journals.elsevier.com/economics-letters... |
| Additional Information: | © 2010 Elsevier |
| Divisions: | Social Policy |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HV Social pathology. Social and public welfare. Criminology |
| JEL classification: | C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C9 - Design of Experiments > C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D83 - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief |
| Date Deposited: | 19 Feb 2015 15:47 |
| Last Modified: | 03 Apr 2024 20:03 |
| Projects: | PRIN 2007ATXXJ3, SFB/TR 15 |
| Funders: | Wallander-Hedelius foundation, MIUR, MaxLab, Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, CentER at Tilburg University |
| URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/61010 |
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