Andersson, Ola, Galizzi, Matteo M., Hoppe, Tim, Kranz, Sebastian, der Wiel, Karen van and Wengström, Erik (2010) Persuasion in experimental ultimatum games. Economics Letters, 108 (1). pp. 16-18. ISSN 0165-1765
Abstract
We study persuasion effects in experimental ultimatum games and find that Proposers' payoffs significantly increase if, along with offers, they can send messages which Responders read before deciding. Higher payoffs are driven by both lower offers and higher acceptance rates.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | http://www.journals.elsevier.com/economics-letters... |
| Additional Information: | © 2010 Elsevier |
| Library of Congress subject classification: | H Social Sciences > HV Social pathology. Social and public welfare. Criminology |
| Journal of Economic Literature Classification System: | C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C9 - Design of Experiments > C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D83 - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief |
| Sets: | Departments > Social Policy Research centres and groups > LSE Health and Social Care |
| Funders: | Wallander-Hedelius foundation, MIUR, MaxLab, Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, CentER at Tilburg University |
| Projects: | PRIN 2007ATXXJ3, SFB/TR 15 |
| Date Deposited: | 19 Feb 2015 15:47 |
| URL: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/61010/ |
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