Peretz, Ron (2012) The strategic value of recall. Games and economic behavior, 74 (1). pp. 332-351. ISSN 0899-8256
Abstract
This work studies the value of two-person zero-sum repeated games in which at least one of the players is restricted to (mixtures of) bounded recall strategies. A (pure) k-recall strategy is a strategy that relies only on the last k periods of history. This work improves previous results ( [Lehrer, 1988] and [Neyman and Okada, 2009]) on repeated games with bounded recall. We provide an explicit formula for the asymptotic value of the repeated game as a function of the one-stage game, the duration of the repeated game, and the recall of the agents.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | http://www.journals.elsevier.com/games-and-economi... |
| Additional Information: | © 2012 Elsevier |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | bounded recall, bounded memory, bounded rationality, repeated games, entropy, de Bruijn sequences |
| Library of Congress subject classification: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory Q Science > QA Mathematics |
| Journal of Economic Literature Classification System: | C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games |
| Sets: | Departments > Mathematics Collections > Economists Online |
| Rights: | http://www.lse.ac.uk/library/rights/LSERO.htm |
| URL: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/47513/ |
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