Cookies?
Library Header Image
LSE Research Online LSE Library Services

The strategic value of recall

Peretz, Ron (2012) The strategic value of recall. Games and Economic Behavior, 74 (1). pp. 332-351. ISSN 0899-8256

Full text not available from this repository.

Abstract

This work studies the value of two-person zero-sum repeated games in which at least one of the players is restricted to (mixtures of) bounded recall strategies. A (pure) k-recall strategy is a strategy that relies only on the last k periods of history. This work improves previous results ( [Lehrer, 1988] and [Neyman and Okada, 2009]) on repeated games with bounded recall. We provide an explicit formula for the asymptotic value of the repeated game as a function of the one-stage game, the duration of the repeated game, and the recall of the agents.

Item Type: Article
Official URL: http://www.journals.elsevier.com/games-and-economi...
Additional Information: © 2012 Elsevier
Library of Congress subject classification: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Q Science > QA Mathematics
Journal of Economic Literature Classification System: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games
C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
Sets: Departments > Mathematics
Collections > Economists Online
Rights: http://www.lse.ac.uk/library/usingTheLibrary/academicSupport/OA/depositYourResearch.aspx
Date Deposited: 23 Nov 2012 12:11
URL: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/47513/

Actions (login required)

Record administration - authorised staff only Record administration - authorised staff only