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The strategic value of recall

Peretz, Ron (2012) The strategic value of recall. Games and Economic Behavior, 74 (1). pp. 332-351. ISSN 0899-8256

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Identification Number: 10.1016/j.geb.2011.05.013


This work studies the value of two-person zero-sum repeated games in which at least one of the players is restricted to (mixtures of) bounded recall strategies. A (pure) k-recall strategy is a strategy that relies only on the last k periods of history. This work improves previous results ( [Lehrer, 1988] and [Neyman and Okada, 2009]) on repeated games with bounded recall. We provide an explicit formula for the asymptotic value of the repeated game as a function of the one-stage game, the duration of the repeated game, and the recall of the agents.

Item Type: Article
Official URL:
Additional Information: © 2012 Elsevier
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Q Science > QA Mathematics
Sets: Departments > Mathematics
Collections > Economists Online
Date Deposited: 23 Nov 2012 12:11
Last Modified: 03 May 2013 11:16

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