Items where Author is "Felli, Leonardo"

Anderlini, Luca, Felli, Leonardo and Immordino, Giovanni (2019) Costly pretrial agreements. Journal of Legal Studies, 48 (1). 159 - 188. ISSN 0047-2530

Felli, Leonardo and Harris, Christopher (2018) Firm-specific training. Journal of Economic Theory, 175. pp. 585-623. ISSN 0022-0531

Felli, Leonardo and Hortala-Vallve, Rafael ORCID: 0000-0002-9677-497X (2016) Collusion, blackmail and whistle-blowing. Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 11 (3). pp. 279-312. ISSN 1554-0626

Felli, Leonardo and Roberts, Kevin (2015) Does competition solve the hold-up problem? Economica. ISSN 0013-0427

Anderlini, Luca, Felli, Leonardo and Riboni, Alessandro (2014) Why stare decisis? Review of Economic Dynamics, 17 (4). 726 - 738. ISSN 1094-2025

Baccara, Mariagiovanna, Collard-Wexler, Allan, Felli, Leonardo and Yariv, Leeat (2014) Child adoption matching: preferences for gender and race. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 6 (3). pp. 133-158. ISSN 1945-7782

Anderlini, Luca, Felli, Leonardo, Immordino, Giovanni and Riboni, Alessandro (2013) Legal institutions, innovation, and growth. International Economic Review, 54 (3). pp. 937-956. ISSN 0020-6598

Baccara, Mariagiovanna, Collard-Wexler, Allan, Felli, Leonardo and Yariv, Leeat (2013) Child adoption matching: preferences for gender and race. . London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.

Anderlini, Luca, Felli, Leonardo and Postlewaite, Andrew (2011) Should courts always enforce what contracting parties write? Review of Law and Economics, 7 (1). 15 - 29. ISSN 1555-5879

Felli, Leonardo, Anderlini, Luca and Riboni, Alessandro (2011) Why stare decisis? CEPR Discussion papers (8266). Centre for Economic Policy Research (Great Britain), London, UK.

Felli, Leonardo, Koenen, Johannes and Stahl, Konrad O (2011) Competition and trust: evidence from German car manufacturers. CEPR discussion papers (8265). Centre for Economic Policy Research (Great Britain), London, UK.

Cornelli, Francesca and Felli, Leonardo (2010) How to sell a (bankrupt) company? . Centre for Economic Policy Research (Great Britain), London, UK.

Felli, Leonardo, Baccara, Mariagiovanna, Collard-Wexler, Allan and Yariv, Leeat (2010) Child adoption matching: preferences for gender and race. NBER working paper series (16444). National Bureau of Economic Research, Massachusetts, USA.

Felli, Leonardo, Anderlini, Luca, Immordino, Giovanni and Riboni, Alessandro (2010) Legal institutions, innovation and growth. CESF working papers (256). University of Naples, Naples, Italy.

Anderlini, Luca and Felli, Leonardo (2008) Agency problems. In: Durlauf, Steven N and Blume, Lawrence E, (eds.) New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, UK. ISBN 9780333786765

Anderlini, Luca, Felli, Leonardo and Riboni, A. (2008) Statute law or case law? Mimeo. pp. 1-31.

Anderlini, Luca, Felli, Leonardo and Postlewaite, Andrew (2007) Courts of law and unforeseen contingencies. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 23 (3). pp. 662-684. ISSN 8756-6222

Anderlini, Luca and Felli, Leonardo (2007) Costly contingent contracts: a failure of the Coase theorem. In: Cafaggi, Fabrizio, Nicita, Antonio and Pagano, Ugo, (eds.) Legal Orderings and Economic Institutions. Routledge Siena Studies in Political Economy. Routledge, Oxford, UK. ISBN 9780415329422

Felli, Leonardo and Merlo, Antonio (2007) If you cannot get your friends elected, lobby your enemies. Journal of the European Economic Association, 5 (2-3). pp. 624-635. ISSN 1542-4774

Anderlini, Luca, Felli, Leonardo and Postlewaite, Andrew (2006) Active courts and menu contracts. . Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, London, UK.

Anderlini, Luca, Felli, Leonardo and Postlewaite, Andrew (2006) Should courts always enforce what contracting parties write? STICERD Discussion Papers (TE/06/510). Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, London, UK.

Felli, Leonardo, Anderlini, Luca and Al-Najjar, Nabil (2006) Undescribable events. Review of Economic Studies, 73 (4). pp. 849-868. ISSN 0034-6527

Felli, Leonardo and Harris, Christopher (2006) Firm-specific training. . Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, London, UK.

Felli, Leonardo and Merlo, Antonio (2006) Endogenous lobbying. Journal of the European Economic Association, 4 (1). pp. 180-215. ISSN 1542-4766

Felli, Leonardo and Anderlini, Luca (2006) Transaction costs and the robustness of the Coase Theorem. The Economic Journal, 116 (508). pp. 223-245. ISSN 0013-0133

Anderlini, Luca and Felli, Leonardo (2004) Bounded rationality and incomplete contracts. Research in Economics, 58 (1). pp. 3-30. ISSN 1090-9443

Anderlini, Luca and Felli, Leonardo (2004) Book review: economics and language: five essays by Ariel Rubinstein, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000. Economica, 71 (281). pp. 169-171. ISSN 0013-0427

Anderlini, Luca, Felli, Leonardo and Postlewaite, Andrew (2004) Should courts always enforce what contracting parties write? CEPR Discussion Papers (DP4197). Center for Economic Policy Research, London, UK.

Anderlini, Luca, Felli, Leonardo and Postlewaite, Andrew (2003) Should courts always enforce what contracting parties write? STICERD Discussion Papers (TE/2003/464). Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, London, UK.

Anderlini, Luca, Felli, Leonardo and Postlewaite, Andrew (2003) Courts of law and unforeseen contingencies. . Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, London, UK.

Felli, Leonardo and Merlo, Antonio (2003) Endogenous lobbying. . Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, London, UK.

Felli, Leonardo and Roberts, Kevin W. S. (2002) Does competition solve the hold-up problem? . Centre for Economic Policy Research (Great Britain), London, UK.

Al-Najjar, Nabil, Anderlini, Luca and Felli, Leonardo (2002) Unforeseen contingencies. . Centre for Economic Policy Research (Great Britain), London, UK.

Al-Najjar, Nabil, Anderlini, Luca and Felli, Leonardo (2002) Unforeseen contingencies. . Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, London, UK.

Felli, Leonardo and Merlo, Antonio (2002) Endogenous lobbying. . Centre for Economic Policy Research (Great Britain), London, UK.

Anderlini, Luca, Felli, Leonardo and Postlewaite, Andrew (2001) Courts of law and unforeseen contingencies. . Centre for Economic Policy Research (Great Britain), London, UK.

Felli, Leonardo and Roberts, Kevin (2001) Does competition solve the hold-up problem? . Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, London, UK.

Felli, Leonardo and Anderlini, Luca (2001) Costly bargaining and renegotiation. Econometrica, 69 (2). pp. 377-411. ISSN 0012-9682

Anderlini, Luca and Felli, Leonardo (2000) Bounded rationality and incomplete contracts. . Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, London, UK.

Cornelli, Francesca and Felli, Leonardo (2000) How to sell a (bankrupt) company? . CESifo, Munich, Germany.

Anderlini, Luca and Felli, Leonardo (2000) Transaction costs and the robustness of the Coase Theorem. . Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, London, UK.

Felli, Leonardo and Roberts, Kevin (2000) Competition and hold-ups. In: Atkinson, Tony, Glennerster, Howard and Stern, Nicholas, (eds.) Putting Economics to Work : Volume in Honour of Michio Morishima. STICERD Occasional Paper (22). Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, London, UK, pp. 31-70. ISBN 0753013991

Felli, Leonardo and Villas-Boas, J. Miguel (2000) Renegotiation and collusion in organizations. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 9 (4). pp. 453-483. ISSN 1058-6407

Anderlini, Luca and Felli, Leonardo (1999) Incomplete contracts and complexity costs. Theory and Decision, 46 (1). pp. 23-50. ISSN 1573-7187

Cornelli, Francesca and Felli, Leonardo (1998) Revenue efficiency and change of control: the case of bankruptcy. CEPR Discussion Paper (2030). Centre for Economic Policy Research (Great Britain), London, UK.

Anderlini, Luca and Felli, Leonardo (1998) Costly bargaining and renegotiation. . Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, London, UK.

Anderlini, Luca and Felli, Leonardo (1998) Costly coasian contracts. . Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, London, UK.

Cornelli, Francesca and Felli, Leonardo (1998) Revenue efficiency and change of control: the case of bankruptcy. Financial Markets Group Discussion Papers (300). Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.

Felli, Leonardo and Ortalo-Magne, Francois (1998) Technological Innovations Slumps and Booms. CEP Discussion Papers (CEPDP0394). London School of Economics and Political Science. Centre for Economic Performance, London, UK.

Felli, Leonardo and Ortalo-Magné, François (1998) Technological innovations slumps and booms. CEP Discussion Paper (394). London School of Economics and Political Science. Centre for Economic Performance, London, UK.

Anderlini, Luca and Felli, Leonardo (1998) Describability and agency problems. European Economic Review, 42 (1). pp. 35-59. ISSN 0014-2921

Felli, Leonardo and Ortalo-Magné, François (1997) Technological innovations: slumps and booms. CARESS Working Paper (97-17). University of Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania, USA.

Cornelli, Francesca and Felli, Leonardo (1997) Ex-ante efficiency of bankruptcy procedures. European Economic Review, 41 (3-5). pp. 475-485. ISSN 0014-2921

Anderlini, Luca and Felli, Leonardo (1996) Costly contingent contracts. . Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, London, UK.

Felli, Leonardo and Villas-Boas, J.M. (1996) Friendships in vertical relations. . Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, London, UK.

Felli, Leonardo and Harris, Christopher (1996) A note on G. Bertola and L. Felli (1993) “Job matching and the distribution of surplus” Ricerche Economiche, 47, 65–92. Ricerche Economiche, 50 (3). pp. 317-319. ISSN 0035-5054

Felli, Leonardo and Harris, Christopher (1996) Learning, wage dynamics, and firm-specific human capital. Journal of Political Economy, 104 (4). pp. 838-868. ISSN 0022-3808

Felli, Leonardo and Hortala-Vallve, R. ORCID: 0000-0002-9677-497X (1996) Preventing collusion through discretion. . Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, London, UK.

Cornelli, Francesca and Felli, Leonardo (1995) The theory of bankruptcy and mechanism design. In: Eichengreen, Barry and Portes, R, (eds.) Crisis? What Crisis? Orderly Workouts for Sovereign Debtors. Centre for Economic Policy Research (Great Britain), London, UK, pp. 69-86. ISBN 1898128235

Anderlini, Luca and Felli, Leonardo (1994) Incomplete written contracts: undescribable states of nature. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109 (4). pp. 1085-1124. ISSN 0033-5533

Felli, Leonardo and Harris, Christopher (1994) Job matching, learning and the distribution of surplus. . Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, London, UK.

Bertola, G. and Felli, Leonardo (1993) Job matching and the distribution of producer surplus. Ricerche Economiche, 47 (1). pp. 65-92. ISSN 0035-5054

Anderlini, Luca and Felli, Leonardo (1993) Incomplete written contracts: endogenous agency problems. . Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, London, UK.

Anderlini, Luca and Felli, Leonardo (1993) Incomplete written contracts: undescribable states of nature. . Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, London, UK.

Diamond, Peter and Felli, Leonardo (1993) Search, sticky prices and deflation. Mimeo.

Felli, Leonardo (1993) Turnovers and asymptotic behavior of workers. Economics Letters, 42 (1). pp. 43-50. ISSN 0165-1765

Felli, Leonardo and Ichino, Andrea (1988) Do marginal employment subsidies increase re-employment probabilities? Labour, 2 (3). pp. 63-89. ISSN 1121-7081