Endogenous lobbying

Felli, Leonardo and Merlo, Antonio (2002) Endogenous lobbying. 3174. Centre for Economic Policy Research, London, UK.

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Abstract

In this paper, we present a citizen-candidate model of representative democracy with endogenous lobbying. We find that lobbying induces policy compromise and always affects equilibrium policy outcomes. In particular, even though the policy preferences of lobbies are relatively extreme, lobbying biases the outcome of the political process toward the centre of the policy space, and extreme policies cannot emerge in equilibrium. Moreover, in equilibrium, not all lobbies participate in the policy-making process.

Item Type:	Monograph (Discussion Paper)
Official URL:	http://www.cepr.org
Additional Information:	© 2002 Leonardo Felli and Antonio Merlo
Library of Congress subject classification:	J Political Science > JA Political science (General) H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Journal of Economic Literature Classification System:	D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D74 - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation
Sets:	Research centres and groups > Financial Markets Group (FMG) Collections > Economists Online Departments > Economics Research centres and groups > Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines (STICERD) Collections > LSE Financial Markets Group (FMG) Working Papers
Identification Number:	3174
Date Deposited:	04 Jun 2008 14:47
URL:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/5351/

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