Felli, Leonardo and Merlo, Antonio (2002) Endogenous lobbying. . Centre for Economic Policy Research (Great Britain), London, UK.
Full text not available from this repository.Abstract
In this paper, we present a citizen-candidate model of representative democracy with endogenous lobbying. We find that lobbying induces policy compromise and always affects equilibrium policy outcomes. In particular, even though the policy preferences of lobbies are relatively extreme, lobbying biases the outcome of the political process toward the centre of the policy space, and extreme policies cannot emerge in equilibrium. Moreover, in equilibrium, not all lobbies participate in the policy-making process.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Discussion Paper) |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | http://www.cepr.org |
| Additional Information: | © 2002 Leonardo Felli and Antonio Merlo |
| Divisions: | Financial Markets Group Economics STICERD |
| Subjects: | J Political Science > JA Political science (General) H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory |
| JEL classification: | D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D74 - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation |
| Date Deposited: | 04 Jun 2008 14:47 |
| Last Modified: | 15 Sep 2023 22:53 |
| URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/5351 |
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