Does competition solve the hold-up problem?

Felli, Leonardo and Roberts, Kevin W. S. (2002) Does competition solve the hold-up problem? . Centre for Economic Policy Research, London, UK.

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Abstract

In an environment in which both buyers and sellers can undertake match specific investments, the presence of market competition for matches may solve hold-up and coordination problems generated by the absence of complete contingent contracts. In particular, this Paper shows that when matching is assortative and sellers’ investments precede market competition then investments are constrained efficient. One equilibrium is efficient with efficient matches but also there can be additional equilibria with coordination failures. Different types of inefficiency arise when sellers undertake investment before market competition. These inefficiencies lead to sellers’ underinvestments due to a hold-up problem but, when competition is at its peak, there is a unique equilibrium of the competition game with efficient matches — no coordination failures — and the aggregate hold-up inefficiency is small in a well-defined sense independent of market size.

Item Type:	Monograph (Discussion Paper)
Official URL:	http://www.cepr.org
Additional Information:	© 2002 Leonardo Felli and Kevin W S Roberts
Divisions:	Financial Markets Group Economics STICERD
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor
JEL classification:	D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D83 - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief D - Microeconomics > D4 - Market Structure and Pricing > D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Date Deposited:	04 Jun 2008 14:21
Last Modified:	11 Feb 2021 00:24
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/5348

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