Felli, Leonardo and Villas-Boas, J.M. (1996) Friendships in vertical relations. TE/1996/314. Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.
Full text not available from this repository.Abstract
It has been argued that collusion among the members of an organization or a vertical structure creates efficiency losses, and hence should be prevented. This paper shows that whenever collusion takes the form of co-insurance agreements, here called ?friendships?, among the members of a vertical structure this may not be the case. Indeed, in such a case, collusion yields only a redistribution of surplus among the members of the vertical structure. Hence, its efficiency costs may be reduced by allowing these ?friendships? to take place, rather than preventing them, and accounting for the redistribution in the design of the optimal incentive scheme.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Discussion Paper) |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | http://sticerd.lse.ac.uk/ |
| Additional Information: | © 1996 Leonardo Felli, J M Villas-Boas |
| Library of Congress subject classification: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor |
| Sets: | Research centres and groups > Financial Markets Group (FMG) Collections > Economists Online Research centres and groups > Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines (STICERD) Departments > Economics Collections > LSE Financial Markets Group (FMG) Working Papers |
| Identification Number: | TE/1996/314 |
| Date Deposited: | 28 Feb 2008 |
| URL: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/3600/ |
Actions (login required)
 |
Record administration - authorised staff only |
