Anderlini, Luca and Felli, Leonardo (1996) Costly contingent contracts. . Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, London, UK.
Full text not available from this repository.Abstract
We identify and investigate the basic ?hold-up? problem which arises whenever each party to a contingent contract has to pay some ex-ante cost for the contract to become feasible. We then proceed to show that, under plausible circumstances, a ?contractual solution? to this hold-up problem is not available. This is because a contractual solution to the hold-up problem typically entails writing a ?contract over a contract? which generates a fresh set of ex-ante costs, and hence is associated with a new hold-up problem. We conclude the paper investigating two applications of our results to a static and to a dynamic principal-agent model.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Discussion Paper) |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | http://sticerd.lse.ac.uk/ |
| Additional Information: | © 1996 Luca Anderlini, Leonardo Felli |
| Divisions: | Financial Markets Group STICERD Economics |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory |
| Date Deposited: | 28 Feb 2008 |
| Last Modified: | 09 May 2025 00:33 |
| URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/3598 |
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