Investment banking careers: an equilibrium theory of overpaid jobs

Axelson, Ulf ORCID: 0000-0002-1265-2714 and Bond, Philip (2011) Investment banking careers: an equilibrium theory of overpaid jobs. Financial Markets Group Discussion Papers (690). Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.

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Abstract

We develop an optimal dynamic contracting theory of overpay for jobs in which moral hazard is a key concern, such as investment banking. Overpaying jobs feature up-or-out contracts and long work hours, yet give more utility to workers than their outside option dictates. Labor markets feature "dynamic segregation," where some workers are put on fast-track careers in overpaying jobs and others have no chance of entering the overpaying segment. Entering the labor market in bad economic times has life-long negative implications for a worker's career both in terms of job placement and contract terms. Moral hazard problems are exacerbated in good economic times, which leads to countercyclical productivity. Finally, workers whose talent would be more valuable elsewhere can be lured into overpaying jobs, while the most talented workers might be unable to land these jobs because they are "too hard to manage".

Item Type:	Monograph (Discussion Paper)
Official URL:	https://www.fmg.ac.uk/
Additional Information:	© 2011 The Authors
Divisions:	Finance
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions H Social Sciences > HG Finance
JEL classification:	E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E2 - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment > E24 - Macroeconomics: Employment; Unemployment; Wages; Intergenerational Income Distribution (includes wage indexation) G - Financial Economics > G2 - Financial Institutions and Services > G24 - Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage; Rating Agencies J - Labor and Demographic Economics > J3 - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs > J31 - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials by Skill, Training, Occupation, etc. J - Labor and Demographic Economics > J3 - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs > J33 - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods J - Labor and Demographic Economics > J4 - Particular Labor Markets > J41 - Contracts: Specific Human Capital, Matching Models, Efficiency Wage Models, and Internal Labor Markets M - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting > M5 - Personnel Economics > M51 - Firm Employment Decisions; Promotions (hiring, firing, turnover, part-time, temporary workers, seniority issues) M - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting > M5 - Personnel Economics > M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects (stock options, fringe benefits, incentives, family support programs, seniority issues)
Date Deposited:	29 Jun 2023 09:30
Last Modified:	01 Oct 2024 03:20
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/119062

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