Positive framing does not solve the tragedy of the commons

Isaksen, Elisabeth Thuestad ORCID: 0000-0002-6557-8001, Brekke, Kjell Arne and Richter, Andries (2019) Positive framing does not solve the tragedy of the commons. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 95. pp. 45-56. ISSN 0095-0696

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Abstract

We investigate whether positive framing increases cooperation in three social dilemmas with slightly different properties: a linear public goods (PG) game, a non-linear PG game, and a common pool resource (CPR) game. Results from our laboratory experiments show that contributions to a linear PG are higher if the externality is framed positively, rather than negatively, corroborating earlier findings by Andreoni (1995). By contrast, we find no such framing effects in the non-linear PG game or the CPR game. In these games, the best response in the material payoffs is to contribute less if others contribute more, counteracting effects of pro-social preferences. Positive framing therefore does not help to solve the tragedy of the commons.

Item Type:	Article
Official URL:	https://www.journals.elsevier.com/journal-of-envir...
Additional Information:	© 2018 Elsevier B.V.
Divisions:	Grantham Research Institute
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor > HD28 Management. Industrial Management
JEL classification:	C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C9 - Design of Experiments > C92 - Laboratory, Group Behavior D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D70 - General
Date Deposited:	19 Nov 2018 15:20
Last Modified:	20 Mar 2024 00:51
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/90607

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