Browse by JEL codes

B

Bandiera, Oriana ORCID: 0009-0002-6817-793X, Barankay, Iwan and Rasul, Imran (2005) Cooperation in collective action. Economics of Transition, 13 (3). pp. 473-498. ISSN 0967-0750

Bosetti, Valentina, Heugues, Melanie and Tavoni, Alessandro ORCID: 0000-0002-2057-5720 (2017) Luring others into climate action: coalition formation games with threshold and spillover effects. Oxford Economic Papers, 69 (2). pp. 410-431. ISSN 0030-7653

Bougheas, Spiro, Nieboer, Jeroen and Sefton, Martin (2015) Risk taking and information aggregation in groups. Journal of Economic Psychology, 51. pp. 34-47. ISSN 0167-4870

Brañas-Garza, Pablo, Galizzi, Matteo M. ORCID: 0000-0002-7757-5625 and Nieboer, Jeroen (2014) Digit ratio and risk taking: evidence from a large, multi-ethnic sample. Working Papers (14-23). Chapman University, Economic Science Institute, California, USA.

Brañas-Garza, Pablo, Galizzi, Matteo M. ORCID: 0000-0002-7757-5625 and Nieboer, Jeroen (2018) Experimental and self-reported measures of risk taking and digit ratio (2D:4D): evidence from a large, systematic study. International Economic Review, 59 (3). 1131 - 1157. ISSN 0020-6598

C

Clark, Andrew E., Masclet, David and Villeval, Marie-Claire (2008) Effort and comparison income: experimental and survey evidence. CEP Discussion Paper (886). London School of Economics and Political Science. Centre for Economic Performance, London, UK. ISBN 9780853282938

F

Fischer, Gregory (2011) Contract structure, risk sharing and investment choice. Economic Organisation and Public Policy Discussion Papers (EOPP/2011/23). Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, London, UK.

Fischer, Gregory (2013) Contract structure, risk sharing and investment choice. Econometrica, 81 (3). pp. 883-939. ISSN 0012-9682

G

Galizzi, Matteo M. ORCID: 0000-0002-7757-5625 and Navarro-Martínez, Daniel (2015) On the external validity of social preferences games: a systematic lab-field study. Barcelona GSE Working Paper (802). Barcelona GSE, Barcelona, Spain.

Galizzi, Matteo M. ORCID: 0000-0002-7757-5625 and Nieboer, Jeroen (2015) Digit ratio (2D:4D) and altruism: evidence from a large, multi-ethnic sample. Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience, 9. p. 41. ISSN 1662-5153

I

Isaksen, Elisabeth Thuestad ORCID: 0000-0002-6557-8001, Brekke, Kjell Arne and Richter, Andries (2019) Positive framing does not solve the tragedy of the commons. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 95. pp. 45-56. ISSN 0095-0696

K

Kirchsteiger, Georg and Prat, Andrea (2001) Inefficient equilibria in lobbying. Journal of Public Economics, 82 (3). pp. 349-375. ISSN 0047-2727

M

Mäs, Michael and Nax, Heinrich H. (2016) A behavioral study of “noise” in coordination games. Journal of Economic Theory, 162. pp. 195-208. ISSN 0022-0531

N

Nax, Heinrich H., Balietti, Stefano, Murphy, Ryan O. and Helbing, Dirk (2015) Meritocratic matching can dissolve the efficiency-equality tradeoff: the case of voluntary contributions. . Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule Zürich, Zurich, Switzerland.

S

Shreedhar, Ganga ORCID: 0000-0003-2517-2485, Tavoni, Alessandro ORCID: 0000-0002-2057-5720 and Marchiori, Carmen (2018) Monitoring and punishment networks in a common-pool resource dilemma: experimental evidence. Working Paper (327). Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment, The Centre for Climate Change Economics and Policy, London, UK.

Shreedhar, Ganga ORCID: 0000-0003-2517-2485, Tavoni, Alessandro ORCID: 0000-0002-2057-5720 and Marchiori, Carmen (2020) Monitoring and punishment networks in an experimental common pool resource dilemma. Environment and Development Economics, 25 (1). 66 - 94. ISSN 1355-770X

W

Weizsacker, Georg (2008) Do we follow others when we should? A simple test of rational expectations. . ESRC Centre for Economic Learning and Social Evolution, University College London, London, UK.

İ

İriş, D., Lee, J. and Tavoni, A. ORCID: 0000-0002-2057-5720 (2019) Delegation and public pressure in a threshold public goods game. Environmental and Resource Economics, 74 (3). 1331 - 1353. ISSN 0924-6460