Follower payoffs in symmetric duopoly games

von Stengel, Bernhard ORCID: 0000-0002-3488-8322 (2010) Follower payoffs in symmetric duopoly games. Games and Economic Behavior, 69 (2). pp. 512-516. ISSN 0899-8256

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Abstract

This paper compares the leader and follower payoff in a duopoly game, as they arise in sequential play, with the Nash payoff in simultaneous play. If the game is symmetric, has a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium, and players' payoffs are monotonic in the opponent's choice along their own best reply function, then the follower payoff is either higher than the leader payoff, or even lower than in the simultaneous game. This gap for the possible follower payoff had not been observed in earlier duopoly models of endogenous timing.

Item Type:	Article
Official URL:	http://www.elsevier.com/wps/find/journaldescriptio...
Additional Information:	© 2009 Elsevier Inc.
Divisions:	Mathematics
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
JEL classification:	L - Industrial Organization > L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance > L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games D - Microeconomics > D4 - Market Structure and Pricing > D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Date Deposited:	31 Mar 2010 11:28
Last Modified:	25 Jan 2024 07:15
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/27651

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