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Abbink, Klaus, Irlenbusch, Bernd, Pezanis-Christou, Paul, Rockenbach, Bettina, Sadrieh, Abdolkarim and Selten, Reinhard (2005) An experimental test of design alternatives for the British 3G/UMTS auction. European Economic Review, 49 (2). pp. 505-530. ISSN 0014-2921
    Ashkenazi-Golan, Galit  ORCID: 0000-0003-3896-4131, Tsodikovich, Yevgeny and Viossat, Yannick 
  
(2023)
I want to tell you? Maximizing revenue in first-price two-stage auctions.
    Economic Theory, 76 (4).
     1329 - 1362.
     ISSN 0938-2259
ORCID: 0000-0003-3896-4131, Tsodikovich, Yevgeny and Viossat, Yannick 
  
(2023)
I want to tell you? Maximizing revenue in first-price two-stage auctions.
    Economic Theory, 76 (4).
     1329 - 1362.
     ISSN 0938-2259
  
  
Asker, John, Grosskopf, Brit, McKinney, C. Nicholas, Niederle, Muriel, Roth, Alvin E. and Weizsacker, Georg (2004) Teaching auction strategy using experiments administered via the internet. Journal of Economic Education, 35 (4). pp. 330-342. ISSN 0022-0485
    Belev, Sergey G., Veterinarov, Victor V.  ORCID: 0000-0002-0169-1451 and Matveev, Evgenii O. 
  
(2023)
Переход к электронным процедурам в государственных закупках в условиях фаворитизма.
    Voprosy Ekonomiki, 2023 (9).
     47 - 64.
     ISSN 0042-8736
ORCID: 0000-0002-0169-1451 and Matveev, Evgenii O. 
  
(2023)
Переход к электронным процедурам в государственных закупках в условиях фаворитизма.
    Voprosy Ekonomiki, 2023 (9).
     47 - 64.
     ISSN 0042-8736
  
  
    Bergemann, Dirk and Pesendorfer, Martin  ORCID: 0000-0002-0547-8711 
  
(2007)
Information structures in optimal auctions.
    Journal of Economic Theory, 137 (1).
     pp. 580-609.
     ISSN 1095-7235
ORCID: 0000-0002-0547-8711 
  
(2007)
Information structures in optimal auctions.
    Journal of Economic Theory, 137 (1).
     pp. 580-609.
     ISSN 1095-7235
  
  
    Borgers, Tilman, Cox, Ingemar, Pesendorfer, Martin  ORCID: 0000-0002-0547-8711 and Petricek, Vaclav 
  
(2013)
Equilibrium bids in sponsored search auctions: theory and evidence.
    American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 5 (4).
     pp. 163-187.
     ISSN 1945-7669
ORCID: 0000-0002-0547-8711 and Petricek, Vaclav 
  
(2013)
Equilibrium bids in sponsored search auctions: theory and evidence.
    American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 5 (4).
     pp. 163-187.
     ISSN 1945-7669
  
  
    Brañas-Garza, Pablo, Galizzi, Matteo M.  ORCID: 0000-0002-7757-5625 and Nieboer, Jeroen 
  
(2018)
Experimental and self-reported measures of risk taking and digit ratio (2D:4D): evidence from a large, systematic study.
    International Economic Review, 59 (3).
     1131 - 1157.
     ISSN 0020-6598
ORCID: 0000-0002-7757-5625 and Nieboer, Jeroen 
  
(2018)
Experimental and self-reported measures of risk taking and digit ratio (2D:4D): evidence from a large, systematic study.
    International Economic Review, 59 (3).
     1131 - 1157.
     ISSN 0020-6598
  
  
Chen, Zhuoqiong (Charlie), Ong, David and Segev, Ella (2017) Heterogeneous risk/loss aversion in complete information all-pay auctions. European Economic Review, 95. pp. 23-37. ISSN 0014-2921
    Chernov, Mikhail, Gorbenko, Alexander S. and Makarov, Igor  ORCID: 0009-0006-7557-449X 
  
(2013)
CDS auctions.
    Review of Financial Studies, 26 (3).
     pp. 768-805.
     ISSN 0893-9454
ORCID: 0009-0006-7557-449X 
  
(2013)
CDS auctions.
    Review of Financial Studies, 26 (3).
     pp. 768-805.
     ISSN 0893-9454
  
  
Eeckhout, Jan and Kircher, Philipp (2010) Sorting versus screening: search frictions and competing mechanisms. Journal of Economic Theory, 145 (4). pp. 1354-1385. ISSN 1095-7235
    Galizzi, Matteo M.  ORCID: 0000-0002-7757-5625 and Nieboer, Jeroen 
  
(2015)
Digit ratio (2D:4D) and altruism: evidence from a large, multi-ethnic sample.
    Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience, 9.
     p. 41.
     ISSN 1662-5153
ORCID: 0000-0002-7757-5625 and Nieboer, Jeroen 
  
(2015)
Digit ratio (2D:4D) and altruism: evidence from a large, multi-ethnic sample.
    Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience, 9.
     p. 41.
     ISSN 1662-5153
  
  
    Gentry, Matthew, Komarova, Tatiana  ORCID: 0000-0002-6581-5097 and Schiraldi, Pasquale
ORCID: 0000-0002-6581-5097 and Schiraldi, Pasquale  ORCID: 0000-0003-2469-1734 
  
(2023)
Preferences and performance in simultaneous first-price auctions: a structural analysis.
    Review of Economic Studies, 90 (2).
     852 – 878.
     ISSN 0034-6527
ORCID: 0000-0003-2469-1734 
  
(2023)
Preferences and performance in simultaneous first-price auctions: a structural analysis.
    Review of Economic Studies, 90 (2).
     852 – 878.
     ISSN 0034-6527
  
  
    Jofre-Bonet, Mireia and Pesendorfer, Martin  ORCID: 0000-0002-0547-8711 
  
(2000)
Bidding behavior in a repeated procurement auction: a summary.
    European Economic Review, 44 (4-6).
     pp. 1006-1020.
     ISSN 0014-2921
ORCID: 0000-0002-0547-8711 
  
(2000)
Bidding behavior in a repeated procurement auction: a summary.
    European Economic Review, 44 (4-6).
     pp. 1006-1020.
     ISSN 0014-2921
  
  
    Jofre-Bonet, Mireia and Pesendorfer, Martin  ORCID: 0000-0002-0547-8711 
  
(2014)
Optimal sequential auctions.
    International Journal of Industrial Organization, 33.
     pp. 61-71.
     ISSN 0167-7187
ORCID: 0000-0002-0547-8711 
  
(2014)
Optimal sequential auctions.
    International Journal of Industrial Organization, 33.
     pp. 61-71.
     ISSN 0167-7187
  
  
    Komarova, Tatiana  ORCID: 0000-0002-6581-5097 
  
(2013)
A new approach to identifying generalized competing risks models with application to second-price auctions.
    Quantitative Economics, 4 (2).
     pp. 269-328.
     ISSN 1759-7323
ORCID: 0000-0002-6581-5097 
  
(2013)
A new approach to identifying generalized competing risks models with application to second-price auctions.
    Quantitative Economics, 4 (2).
     pp. 269-328.
     ISSN 1759-7323
  
  
Koutroumpis, Pantelis and Cave, Martin (2018) Auction design and auction outcomes. Journal of Regulatory Economics, 53 (3). pp. 275-297. ISSN 0922-680X
    Laohakunakorn, Krittanai, Levy, Gilat  ORCID: 0009-0006-7641-1668 and Razin, Ronny
ORCID: 0009-0006-7641-1668 and Razin, Ronny  ORCID: 0009-0009-5169-0180 
  
(2019)
Private and common value auctions with ambiguity over correlation.
    Journal of Economic Theory, 184.
    
     ISSN 0022-0531
ORCID: 0009-0009-5169-0180 
  
(2019)
Private and common value auctions with ambiguity over correlation.
    Journal of Economic Theory, 184.
    
     ISSN 0022-0531
  
  
    Martin, Julien, Pesendorfer, Martin  ORCID: 0000-0002-0547-8711 and Shannon, Jack 
  
(2025)
Underbidding for oil and gas tracts.
    American Economic Review, 115 (8).
     2755 - 2780.
     ISSN 0002-8282
ORCID: 0000-0002-0547-8711 and Shannon, Jack 
  
(2025)
Underbidding for oil and gas tracts.
    American Economic Review, 115 (8).
     2755 - 2780.
     ISSN 0002-8282
  
  
    Otsu, Taisuke  ORCID: 0000-0002-2307-143X, Pesendorfer, Martin
ORCID: 0000-0002-2307-143X, Pesendorfer, Martin  ORCID: 0000-0002-0547-8711 and Takahashi, Yuya 
  
(2016)
Pooling data across markets in dynamic Markov games.
    Quantitative Economics, 7 (2).
     523 - 559.
     ISSN 1759-7323
ORCID: 0000-0002-0547-8711 and Takahashi, Yuya 
  
(2016)
Pooling data across markets in dynamic Markov games.
    Quantitative Economics, 7 (2).
     523 - 559.
     ISSN 1759-7323
  
  
    Palacios-Huerta, Ignacio, Parkes, David C. and Steinberg, Richard  ORCID: 0000-0001-9636-472X 
  
(2024)
Combinatorial auctions in practice.
    Journal of Economic Literature, 62 (2).
     517 - 553.
     ISSN 0022-0515
ORCID: 0000-0001-9636-472X 
  
(2024)
Combinatorial auctions in practice.
    Journal of Economic Literature, 62 (2).
     517 - 553.
     ISSN 0022-0515
  
  
    Myers, Geoffrey  ORCID: 0000-0002-0764-6192 
  
(2023)
Afterword: reflections for future auctions.
    
      In: 
      Spectrum Auctions: Designing markets to benefit the public, industry and the economy.
    
    LSE Press, London, UK, 215 - 220.
     ISBN 9781911712039
ORCID: 0000-0002-0764-6192 
  
(2023)
Afterword: reflections for future auctions.
    
      In: 
      Spectrum Auctions: Designing markets to benefit the public, industry and the economy.
    
    LSE Press, London, UK, 215 - 220.
     ISBN 9781911712039
  
  
    Myers, Geoffrey  ORCID: 0000-0002-0764-6192 
  
(2023)
Applying expertise in decision-making processes.
    
      In: 
      Spectrum Auctions: Designing markets to benefit the public, industry and the economy.
    
    LSE Press, London, UK, 69 - 92.
     ISBN 9781911712039
ORCID: 0000-0002-0764-6192 
  
(2023)
Applying expertise in decision-making processes.
    
      In: 
      Spectrum Auctions: Designing markets to benefit the public, industry and the economy.
    
    LSE Press, London, UK, 69 - 92.
     ISBN 9781911712039
  
  
    Myers, Geoffrey  ORCID: 0000-0002-0764-6192 
  
(2023)
Auction bidding and outcomes.
    
      In: 
      Spectrum Auctions: Designing markets to benefit the public, industry and the economy.
    
    LSE Press, London, UK, 197 - 213.
     ISBN 9781911712039
ORCID: 0000-0002-0764-6192 
  
(2023)
Auction bidding and outcomes.
    
      In: 
      Spectrum Auctions: Designing markets to benefit the public, industry and the economy.
    
    LSE Press, London, UK, 197 - 213.
     ISBN 9781911712039
  
  
    Myers, Geoffrey  ORCID: 0000-0002-0764-6192 
  
(2023)
Auction design objectives and baseline decisions.
    
      In: 
      Spectrum Auctions: Designing markets to benefit the public, industry and the economy.
    
    LSE Press, London, UK, 115 - 136.
     ISBN 9781911712039
ORCID: 0000-0002-0764-6192 
  
(2023)
Auction design objectives and baseline decisions.
    
      In: 
      Spectrum Auctions: Designing markets to benefit the public, industry and the economy.
    
    LSE Press, London, UK, 115 - 136.
     ISBN 9781911712039
  
  
    Myers, Geoffrey  ORCID: 0000-0002-0764-6192 
  
(2023)
Choosing an auction format.
    
      In: 
      Spectrum Auctions: Designing markets to benefit the public, industry and the economy.
    
    LSE Press, London, UK, 137 - 161.
     ISBN 9781911712039
ORCID: 0000-0002-0764-6192 
  
(2023)
Choosing an auction format.
    
      In: 
      Spectrum Auctions: Designing markets to benefit the public, industry and the economy.
    
    LSE Press, London, UK, 137 - 161.
     ISBN 9781911712039
  
  
    Myers, Geoffrey  ORCID: 0000-0002-0764-6192 
  
(2023)
Harnessing auctions for better-informed public policy decisions.
    
      In: 
      Spectrum Auctions: Designing markets to benefit the public, industry and the economy.
    
    LSE Press, London, UK, 185 - 195.
     ISBN 9781911712039
ORCID: 0000-0002-0764-6192 
  
(2023)
Harnessing auctions for better-informed public policy decisions.
    
      In: 
      Spectrum Auctions: Designing markets to benefit the public, industry and the economy.
    
    LSE Press, London, UK, 185 - 195.
     ISBN 9781911712039
  
  
    Myers, Geoffrey  ORCID: 0000-0002-0764-6192 
  
(2023)
Introducing spectrum auctions.
    
      In: 
      Spectrum Auctions: Designing markets to benefit the public, industry and the economy.
    
    LSE Press, London, UK, 3 - 11.
     ISBN 9781911712039
ORCID: 0000-0002-0764-6192 
  
(2023)
Introducing spectrum auctions.
    
      In: 
      Spectrum Auctions: Designing markets to benefit the public, industry and the economy.
    
    LSE Press, London, UK, 3 - 11.
     ISBN 9781911712039
  
  
    Myers, Geoffrey  ORCID: 0000-0002-0764-6192 
  
(2023)
Laying foundations before the auction.
    
      In: 
      Spectrum Auctions: Designing markets to benefit the public, industry and the economy.
    
    LSE Press, London, UK, 95 - 113.
     ISBN 9781911712039
ORCID: 0000-0002-0764-6192 
  
(2023)
Laying foundations before the auction.
    
      In: 
      Spectrum Auctions: Designing markets to benefit the public, industry and the economy.
    
    LSE Press, London, UK, 95 - 113.
     ISBN 9781911712039
  
  
    Myers, Geoffrey  ORCID: 0000-0002-0764-6192 
  
(2023)
Market design, economic efficiency, and game theory for spectrum auctions.
    
      In: 
      Spectrum Auctions: Designing markets to benefit the public, industry and the economy.
    
    LSE Press, London, UK, 35 - 52.
     ISBN 9781911712039
ORCID: 0000-0002-0764-6192 
  
(2023)
Market design, economic efficiency, and game theory for spectrum auctions.
    
      In: 
      Spectrum Auctions: Designing markets to benefit the public, industry and the economy.
    
    LSE Press, London, UK, 35 - 52.
     ISBN 9781911712039
  
  
    Myers, Geoffrey  ORCID: 0000-0002-0764-6192 
  
(2023)
Preface.
    
      In: 
      Spectrum Auctions: Designing markets to benefit the public, industry and the economy.
    
    LSE Press, London, UK, ix - x.
     ISBN 9781911712039
ORCID: 0000-0002-0764-6192 
  
(2023)
Preface.
    
      In: 
      Spectrum Auctions: Designing markets to benefit the public, industry and the economy.
    
    LSE Press, London, UK, ix - x.
     ISBN 9781911712039
  
  
    Myers, Geoffrey  ORCID: 0000-0002-0764-6192 
  
(2023)
Promoting downstream competition.
    
      In: 
      Spectrum Auctions: Designing markets to benefit the public, industry and the economy.
    
    LSE Press, London, UK, 163 - 183.
     ISBN 9781911712039
ORCID: 0000-0002-0764-6192 
  
(2023)
Promoting downstream competition.
    
      In: 
      Spectrum Auctions: Designing markets to benefit the public, industry and the economy.
    
    LSE Press, London, UK, 163 - 183.
     ISBN 9781911712039
  
  
    Myers, Geoffrey  ORCID: 0000-0002-0764-6192 
  
(2023)
Regulation, public value, and policymaking.
    
      In: 
      Spectrum Auctions: Designing markets to benefit the public, industry and the economy.
    
    LSE Press, London, UK, 53 - 67.
     ISBN 9781911712039
ORCID: 0000-0002-0764-6192 
  
(2023)
Regulation, public value, and policymaking.
    
      In: 
      Spectrum Auctions: Designing markets to benefit the public, industry and the economy.
    
    LSE Press, London, UK, 53 - 67.
     ISBN 9781911712039
  
  
    Myers, Geoffrey  ORCID: 0000-0002-0764-6192 
  
(2023)
Understanding the radio spectrum, auctions, and the UK case.
    
      In: 
      Spectrum Auctions: Designing markets to benefit the public, industry and the economy.
    
    LSE Press, London, UK, 13 - 33.
     ISBN 9781911712039
ORCID: 0000-0002-0764-6192 
  
(2023)
Understanding the radio spectrum, auctions, and the UK case.
    
      In: 
      Spectrum Auctions: Designing markets to benefit the public, industry and the economy.
    
    LSE Press, London, UK, 13 - 33.
     ISBN 9781911712039
  
  
    Axelson, Ulf  ORCID: 0000-0002-1265-2714 and Makarov, Igor
ORCID: 0000-0002-1265-2714 and Makarov, Igor  ORCID: 0009-0006-7557-449X 
  
(2016)
Informational black holes in financial markets.
    Financial Markets Group Discussion Papers (754).
    Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.
ORCID: 0009-0006-7557-449X 
  
(2016)
Informational black holes in financial markets.
    Financial Markets Group Discussion Papers (754).
    Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.
    
  
  
Baldwin, Elizabeth and Klemperer, Paul (2016) Understanding preferences: "demand types", and the existence of equilibrium with indivisibilities. . London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.
    Bergemann, Dirk and Pesendorfer, Martin  ORCID: 0000-0002-0547-8711 
  
(2001)
Information structures in optimal auctions.
    .
    Centre for Economic Policy Research (Great Britain), London, UK.
ORCID: 0000-0002-0547-8711 
  
(2001)
Information structures in optimal auctions.
    .
    Centre for Economic Policy Research (Great Britain), London, UK.
    
  
  
    Brañas-Garza, Pablo, Galizzi, Matteo M.  ORCID: 0000-0002-7757-5625 and Nieboer, Jeroen 
  
(2014)
Digit ratio and risk taking: evidence from a large, multi-ethnic sample.
    Working Papers (14-23).
    Chapman University, Economic Science Institute, California, USA.
ORCID: 0000-0002-7757-5625 and Nieboer, Jeroen 
  
(2014)
Digit ratio and risk taking: evidence from a large, multi-ethnic sample.
    Working Papers (14-23).
    Chapman University, Economic Science Institute, California, USA.
    
  
  
Calel, Raphael (2010) Auctioning conservation contracts in the presence of externalities. Centre for Climate Change Economics and Policy and Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment (22). Centre for Climate Change Economics and Policy and Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment, London, UK.
    Cantillon, Estelle and Pesendorfer, Martin  ORCID: 0000-0002-0547-8711 
  
(2007)
Combination bidding in multi-unit auctions.
    .
    Centre for Economic Policy Research (Great Britain), London, UK.
ORCID: 0000-0002-0547-8711 
  
(2007)
Combination bidding in multi-unit auctions.
    .
    Centre for Economic Policy Research (Great Britain), London, UK.
    
  
  
    Cantillon, Estelle and Pesendorfer, Martin  ORCID: 0000-0002-0547-8711 
  
(2013)
Combination bidding in multi-unit auctions.
    .
    London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.
ORCID: 0000-0002-0547-8711 
  
(2013)
Combination bidding in multi-unit auctions.
    .
    London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.
    
  
  
Cornelli, Francesca and Felli, Leonardo (2010) How to sell a (bankrupt) company? . Centre for Economic Policy Research (Great Britain), London, UK.
Cornelli, Francesca and Felli, Leonardo (1998) Revenue efficiency and change of control: the case of bankruptcy. CEPR Discussion Paper (2030). Centre for Economic Policy Research (Great Britain), London, UK.
Friederich, Sylvain and Payne, Richard (2002) Dealer liquidity in an auction market: evidence fom the London Stock Exchange. Financial Markets Group Discussion Papers (427). Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.
    Jofre-Bonet, Mireia and Pesendorfer, Martin  ORCID: 0000-0002-0547-8711 
  
(2001)
Estimation of a dynamic auction game.
    .
    National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA., USA.
ORCID: 0000-0002-0547-8711 
  
(2001)
Estimation of a dynamic auction game.
    .
    National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA., USA.
    
  
  
    Otsu, Taisuke  ORCID: 0000-0002-2307-143X, Pesendorfer, Martin
ORCID: 0000-0002-2307-143X, Pesendorfer, Martin  ORCID: 0000-0002-0547-8711 and Takahashi, Yuya 
  
(2013)
Testing for equilibrium multiplicity in dynamic Markov games.
    Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (423).
ORCID: 0000-0002-0547-8711 and Takahashi, Yuya 
  
(2013)
Testing for equilibrium multiplicity in dynamic Markov games.
    Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (423).
    
    
  
  
Pagano, Marco and Röell, Ailsa (1991) Auction and dealership markets: what is the difference? Financial Markets Group Discussion Papers (125). Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.
Satterthwaite, Mark, Williams, Steven R. and Zachariadis, Konstantinos (2012) Price discovery. .
Tabaqchali, Ahmed (2024) A fistful of Dinars: demystifying Iraq’s dollar auction. LSE Middle East Centre Paper Series (85). LSE Middle East Centre, London, UK.
Boerner, Lars, van Bochove, Christiaan and Quint, Daniel (2012) Anglo-Dutch premium auctions in eighteenth-century Amsterdam. In: Modern and Comparative seminar, 2012-11-22, London, United Kingdom, GBR.
    Myers, Geoffrey  ORCID: 0000-0002-0764-6192
  
(2023)
Spectrum auctions: designing markets to benefit the public, industry and the economy.
      
    LSE Press, London, UK.
     ISBN 9781911712039
ORCID: 0000-0002-0764-6192
  
(2023)
Spectrum auctions: designing markets to benefit the public, industry and the economy.
      
    LSE Press, London, UK.
     ISBN 9781911712039