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Sorting versus screening: search frictions and competing mechanisms

Eeckhout, Jan and Kircher, Philipp (2010) Sorting versus screening: search frictions and competing mechanisms. Journal of Economic Theory, 145 (4). pp. 1354-1385. ISSN 1095-7235

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Identification Number: 10.1016/j.jet.2010.01.005


In a market where sellers compete by posting trading mechanisms, we allow for a general search technology and show that its features crucially affect the equilibrium mechanism. Price posting prevails when meetings are rival, i.e., when a meeting by one buyer reduces another buyer's meeting probability. Under price posting buyers reveal their type by sorting ex-ante. Only if the meeting technology is sufficiently non-rival, price posting is not an equilibrium. Multiple buyer types then visit the same sellers who screen ex-post through auctions.

Item Type: Article
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Additional Information: © 2010 Elsevier Inc.
Divisions: Economics
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
JEL classification: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
D - Microeconomics > D4 - Market Structure and Pricing > D44 - Auctions
D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
Date Deposited: 20 Oct 2010 08:29
Last Modified: 18 Jun 2024 01:51

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