Items where Author is "Smart, Michael"

Smart, Michael and Sturm, Daniel M. ORCID: 0000-0001-6408-8089 (2013) Term limits and electoral accountability. Journal of Public Economics, 107. pp. 93-102. ISSN 0047-2727

Besley, Timothy ORCID: 0000-0002-8923-6372 and Smart, Michael (2007) Fiscal restraints and voter welfare. Journal of Public Economics, 91 (3-4). pp. 755-773. ISSN 0047-2727

Smart, Michael and Sturm, Daniel M. ORCID: 0000-0001-6408-8089 (2006) Term limits and electoral accountability. CEPDP (770). London School of Economics and Political Science. Centre for Economic Performance, London, UK. ISBN 0753019876

Smart, Michael and Sturm, Daniel ORCID: 0000-0001-6408-8089 (2006) Term limits and electoral accountability. In: The Governance of Central Banks, 2006-08-31 - 2006-09-01, Stockholm, Sweden, SWE. (Submitted)

Smart, Michael and Sturm, Daniel M. ORCID: 0000-0001-6408-8089 (2006) Term limits and electoral accountability. PSPE working papers (03-2006). Department of Government, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.

Besley, Timothy ORCID: 0000-0002-8923-6372 and Smart, Michael (2005) Fiscal restraints and voter welfare. . Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, London, UK.

Smart, Michael and Sturm, Daniel ORCID: 0000-0001-6408-8089 (2004) Term limits and electoral accountability. CEPR discussion paper (4272). Centre for Economic Policy Research (Great Britain), London, UK.

Sturm, Daniel ORCID: 0000-0001-6408-8089 and Smart, Michael (2003) Term limits and political accountability. In: EEA-ESEM 2003, 2003-08-20 - 2003-08-24, Stockholm, Sweden, SWE. (Submitted)

Smart, Michael and Sturm, Daniel ORCID: 0000-0001-6408-8089 (2003) Term limits and political accountability. In: Annual Meeting of the Public Choice Society and Economic Science Association, 2003-03-21 - 2003-03-23, Nashville, United States, USA. (Submitted)

Besley, Timothy ORCID: 0000-0002-8923-6372 and Smart, Michael (2002) Does tax competition raise voter welfare. CEPR Discussion Paper No. 3131 2002. Centre for Economic Policy Research (Great Britain), London.