Besley, Timothy and Smart, Michael (2005) Fiscal restraints and voter welfare. PEPP/6. Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.
Download (268Kb) | Preview
This paper explores the logic of fiscal restraints in a political agency model with both moral hazard and adverse selection. The role of the political process is both to discipline incumbents who may act against the public interest and to sort in those politicians who are most likely act in voters’interests. We use the model to examine the optimality of ine¢ cient taxation, limits on the size of government, increasing trans- parency, and yardstick competition. Some conclusions are surprising. For example, we show that some forms of fiscal restraint can only be desirable when incumbents are su¢ ciently likely to be benevolent.
|Item Type:||Monograph (Discussion Paper)|
|Additional Information:||© 2005 the author|
|Library of Congress subject classification:||J Political Science > JA Political science (General)
H Social Sciences > HJ Public Finance
|Sets:||Collections > Economists Online
Departments > Economics
Research centres and groups > Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines (STICERD)
|Date Deposited:||10 Mar 2008 11:40|
Actions (login required)
|Record administration - authorised staff only|