Cookies?
Library Header Image
LSE Research Online LSE Library Services

Term limits and electoral accountability

Smart, Michael and Sturm, Daniel M. (2006) Term limits and electoral accountability. CEPDP, 770. Centre for Economic Performance, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK. ISBN 0753019876

[img]
Preview
PDF
Download (301Kb) | Preview

Abstract

Periodic elections are the main instrument through which voters can hold politicians accountable. From this perspective term limits, which restrict voters’ ability to reward politicians with re-election, appear counterproductive. We show that despite the disciplining effect of elections, term limits can be ex ante welfare improving from the perspective of voters. By reducing the value of holding office term limits can induce politicians to implement policies that are closer to their private preferences. Such “truthful” behavior by incumbents in turn results in better screening of incumbents. We show that the combination of these two effects can strictly increase the utility of voters.

Item Type: Monograph (Discussion Paper)
Official URL: http://cep.lse.ac.uk
Additional Information: © 2006 the authors
Library of Congress subject classification: J Political Science > JA Political science (General)
Journal of Economic Literature Classification System: D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
H - Public Economics > H1 - Structure and Scope of Government > H11 - Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government
Sets: Collections > Economists Online
Research centres and groups > Centre for Economic Performance (CEP)
Research centres and groups > Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines (STICERD)
Rights: http://www.lse.ac.uk/library/usingTheLibrary/academicSupport/OA/depositYourResearch.aspx
Identification Number: 770
Date Deposited: 21 Jul 2008 14:54
URL: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/19771/

Actions (login required)

Record administration - authorised staff only Record administration - authorised staff only

Downloads

Downloads per month over past year

View more statistics