Sturm, Daniel and Smart, Michael (2003) Term limits and political accountability. In: EEA-ESEM 2003, 20-24 Aug 2003, Stockholm, Sweden. (Unpublished)
Abstract
This paper analyses the impact of term limits in a political agency model. We find that term limits reduce the value of holding office. This reduction in the re-election incentive can induce politicians to implement policies that are closer to their own private preferences. Such "truthful" behaviour by incumbents will in turn result in a better screening of incumbents whose preferences do not correspond to voters' preferences. We show that these effects can make a two-term term limit, which is the empirically most frequent restriction on tenure, ex ante welfare improving from the perspective of voters
| Item Type: | Conference or Workshop Item (Paper) |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | http://www.eea-esem.com/eea-esem/2003/prog/ |
| Additional Information: | © 2003 the authors |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | Accountability, political economcy and term limits |
| Library of Congress subject classification: | J Political Science > JA Political science (General) |
| Sets: | Collections > Economists Online Research centres and groups > Centre for Economic Performance (CEP) Departments > Economics |
| Rights: | http://www.lse.ac.uk/library/rights/LSERO.htm |
| URL: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/20892/ |
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