Library Header Image
LSE Research Online LSE Library Services

Term limits and political accountability

Sturm, Daniel and Smart, Michael (2003) Term limits and political accountability. In: EEA-ESEM 2003, 20-24 Aug 2003, Stockholm, Sweden. (Unpublished)

Full text not available from this repository.


This paper analyses the impact of term limits in a political agency model. We find that term limits reduce the value of holding office. This reduction in the re-election incentive can induce politicians to implement policies that are closer to their own private preferences. Such "truthful" behaviour by incumbents will in turn result in a better screening of incumbents whose preferences do not correspond to voters' preferences. We show that these effects can make a two-term term limit, which is the empirically most frequent restriction on tenure, ex ante welfare improving from the perspective of voters

Item Type: Conference or Workshop Item (Paper)
Official URL:
Additional Information: © 2003 the authors
Library of Congress subject classification: J Political Science > JA Political science (General)
Sets: Collections > Economists Online
Research centres and groups > Centre for Economic Performance (CEP)
Departments > Economics
Date Deposited: 18 Aug 2008 11:08

Actions (login required)

Record administration - authorised staff only Record administration - authorised staff only