Bryson, Alex, Buraimo, Babatunde and Simmons, Rob (2011) Do salaries improve worker performance? Labour Economics, 18 (4). pp. 424-433. ISSN 0927-5371
Full text not available from this repository.Abstract
We establish the effects of salaries on worker performance by exploiting a natural experiment in which some workers in a particular occupation (football referees) switch from short-term contracts to salaried contracts. Worker performance improves among those who move onto salaried contracts relative to those who do not. The finding is robust to the introduction of worker fixed effects indicating that it is not driven by better workers being awarded salary contracts. Nor is it sensitive to workers sorting into or out of the profession. Improved performance could arise from the additional effort workers exert due to career concerns, the higher income associated with career contracts (an efficiency wage effect) or improvements in worker quality arising from off-the-job training which accompanies the salaried contracts.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | http://www.elsevier.com/wps/find/journaldescriptio... |
| Additional Information: | © 2001 Elsevier |
| Divisions: | Centre for Economic Performance |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor |
| JEL classification: | J - Labor and Demographic Economics > J3 - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs > J33 - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods M - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting > M5 - Personnel Economics > M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects (stock options, fringe benefits, incentives, family support programs, seniority issues) |
| Date Deposited: | 25 Jul 2011 09:17 |
| Last Modified: | 11 Dec 2024 23:55 |
| URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/37565 |
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