Blanes i Vidal, Jordi 
ORCID: 0009-0002-9237-2049, Draca, Mirko and Fons-Rosen, Christian
(2010)
Revolving door lobbyists.
CEP Discussion Papers (CEPDP0993).
London School of Economics and Political Science. Centre for Economic Performance, London, UK.
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Abstract
Washington's 'revolving door' - the movement from government service into the lobbying industry - is regarded as a major concern for policy-making. We study how ex-government staffers benefit from the personal connections acquired during their public service. Lobbyists with experience in the office of a US Senator suffer a 24% drop in generated revenue when that Senator leaves office. The effect is immediate, discontinuous around the exit period and long-lasting. Consistent with the notion that lobbyists sell access to powerful politicians, the drop in revenue is increasing in the seniority of and committee assignments power held by the exiting politician.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Working Paper) |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | http://cep.lse.ac.uk |
| Additional Information: | © 2010 The Authors |
| Divisions: | Centre for Economic Performance |
| Subjects: | J Political Science > JA Political science (General) J Political Science > JK Political institutions (United States) |
| JEL classification: | H - Public Economics > H1 - Structure and Scope of Government > H11 - Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government J - Labor and Demographic Economics > J2 - Time Allocation, Work Behavior, and Employment Determination and Creation; Human Capital; Retirement > J24 - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity J - Labor and Demographic Economics > J4 - Particular Labor Markets > J45 - Public Sector Labor Markets |
| Date Deposited: | 21 Jan 2011 17:07 |
| Last Modified: | 11 Sep 2025 04:23 |
| URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/31546 |
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