Cookies?
Library Header Image
LSE Research Online LSE Library Services

Do salaries improve worker performance?

Bryson, Alex and Buraimo, Babatunde and Simmons, Rob (2011) Do salaries improve worker performance? Labour Economics, 18 (4). pp. 424-433. ISSN 0927-5371

Full text not available from this repository.

Identification Number: 10.1016/j.labeco.2010.12.005

Abstract

We establish the effects of salaries on worker performance by exploiting a natural experiment in which some workers in a particular occupation (football referees) switch from short-term contracts to salaried contracts. Worker performance improves among those who move onto salaried contracts relative to those who do not. The finding is robust to the introduction of worker fixed effects indicating that it is not driven by better workers being awarded salary contracts. Nor is it sensitive to workers sorting into or out of the profession. Improved performance could arise from the additional effort workers exert due to career concerns, the higher income associated with career contracts (an efficiency wage effect) or improvements in worker quality arising from off-the-job training which accompanies the salaried contracts.

Item Type: Article
Official URL: http://www.elsevier.com/wps/find/journaldescriptio...
Additional Information: © 2001 Elsevier
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions
H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor
Sets: Collections > Economists Online
Research centres and groups > Centre for Economic Performance (CEP)
Date Deposited: 25 Jul 2011 09:17
Last Modified: 11 Jun 2014 11:05
URI: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/37565

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item