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Revolving door lobbyists

Blanes i Vidal, Jordi and Draca, Mirko and Fons-Rosen, Christian (2010) Revolving door lobbyists. CEP Discussion Papers, CEPDP0993. Centre for Economic Performance, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.

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Identification Number: CEPDP0993

Abstract

Washington's 'revolving door' - the movement from government service into the lobbying industry - is regarded as a major concern for policy-making. We study how ex-government staffers benefit from the personal connections acquired during their public service. Lobbyists with experience in the office of a US Senator suffer a 24% drop in generated revenue when that Senator leaves office. The effect is immediate, discontinuous around the exit period and long-lasting. Consistent with the notion that lobbyists sell access to powerful politicians, the drop in revenue is increasing in the seniority of and committee assignments power held by the exiting politician.

Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
Official URL: http://cep.lse.ac.uk
Additional Information: © 2010 The Authors
Subjects: J Political Science > JA Political science (General)
J Political Science > JK Political institutions (United States)
Sets: Research centres and groups > Managerial Economics and Strategy Group
Research centres and groups > Centre for Economic Performance (CEP)
Series: Working Papers > CEP Discussion Papers
Date Deposited: 21 Jan 2011 17:07
Last Modified: 28 Feb 2013 15:17
URI: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/31546

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