Revolving door lobbyists

Blanes i Vidal, Jordi ORCID: 0009-0002-9237-2049, Draca, Mirko and Fons-Rosen, Christian (2010) Revolving door lobbyists. CEP Discussion Papers (CEPDP0993). London School of Economics and Political Science. Centre for Economic Performance, London, UK.

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Abstract

Washington's 'revolving door' - the movement from government service into the lobbying industry - is regarded as a major concern for policy-making. We study how ex-government staffers benefit from the personal connections acquired during their public service. Lobbyists with experience in the office of a US Senator suffer a 24% drop in generated revenue when that Senator leaves office. The effect is immediate, discontinuous around the exit period and long-lasting. Consistent with the notion that lobbyists sell access to powerful politicians, the drop in revenue is increasing in the seniority of and committee assignments power held by the exiting politician.

Item Type:	Monograph (Working Paper)
Official URL:	http://cep.lse.ac.uk
Additional Information:	© 2010 The Authors
Divisions:	Centre for Economic Performance
Subjects:	J Political Science > JA Political science (General) J Political Science > JK Political institutions (United States)
JEL classification:	H - Public Economics > H1 - Structure and Scope of Government > H11 - Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government J - Labor and Demographic Economics > J2 - Time Allocation, Work Behavior, and Employment Determination and Creation; Human Capital; Retirement > J24 - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity J - Labor and Demographic Economics > J4 - Particular Labor Markets > J45 - Public Sector Labor Markets
Date Deposited:	21 Jan 2011 17:07
Last Modified:	11 Dec 2024 19:00
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/31546

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