Organization of the state: home assignment and bureaucrat performance

Xu, Guo, Bertrand, Marianne and Burgess, Robin ORCID: 0009-0002-1187-3248 (2023) Organization of the state: home assignment and bureaucrat performance. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 39 (2). 371 - 419. ISSN 8756-6222

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Abstract

How to allocate personnel is a central question in the organization of the state. We link survey data on the performance of 1471 elite civil servants in India to their personnel records between 1975 and 2005 to study how home allocations affect their performance and careers. Using exogenous variation in home assignment generated by an allocation rule, we find that bureaucrats assigned to their home states are perceived to be less effective and more likely to be suspended. These negative effects are driven by states with higher levels of corruption and cohorts with greater numbers of home state officers.

Item Type:	Article
Official URL:	https://academic.oup.com/jleo
Additional Information:	© 2021 The Author(s)
Divisions:	Economics
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory K Law H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor > HD28 Management. Industrial Management
JEL classification:	J - Labor and Demographic Economics > J4 - Particular Labor Markets > J45 - Public Sector Labor Markets O - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth > O4 - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity > O40 - General D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D73 - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption M - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting > M5 - Personnel Economics > M50 - General
Date Deposited:	31 Jul 2023 10:51
Last Modified:	18 Nov 2024 21:24
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/119871

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