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Maximizing social welfare in congestion games via redistribution

Naroditskiy, Victor and Steinberg, Richard (2015) Maximizing social welfare in congestion games via redistribution. Games and Economic Behavior, 93. pp. 24-41. ISSN 0899-8256

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Identification Number: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.06.010


It is well-known that efficient use of congestible resources can be achieved via marginal pricing; however, payments collected from the agents generate a budget surplus, which reduces social welfare. We show that an asymptotically first-best solution in the number of agents can be achieved by the appropriate redistribution of the budget surplus back to the agents.

Item Type: Article
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Additional Information: © 2015 Elsevier Inc.
Divisions: LSE
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions
Q Science > QA Mathematics
JEL classification: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games
D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
Sets: Research centres and groups > Public Management Group
Collections > Economists Online
Date Deposited: 20 Jul 2015 11:11
Last Modified: 20 Apr 2021 02:36

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