Alonso, Ricardo and Câmara, Odilon (2014) Persuading skeptics and reaffirming believers. USC Marshall School of Business Research Paper Series. University of Southern California, Marshall School of Business, Los Angeles, CA, USA.
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Abstract
In a world where rational individuals may hold different prior beliefs, a sender can influence the behavior of a receiver by controlling the informativeness of a signal. We characterize the set of distributions of posterior beliefs that can be induced by a signal, and provide necessary and sufficient conditions for a sender to benefit from information control. We examine a class of models with no value of information control under common priors, and show that a sender generically benefits from information control under heterogeneous priors. We extend our analysis to cases where the receiver’s prior is unknown to the sender.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Discussion Paper) |
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| Official URL: | http://www.marshall.usc.edu/ |
| Additional Information: | © 2014 The Authors, USC Marshall School of Business |
| Divisions: | Management |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor > HD28 Management. Industrial Management H Social Sciences > HE Transportation and Communications |
| JEL classification: | D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D83 - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief M - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting > M3 - Marketing and Advertising > M31 - Marketing |
| Date Deposited: | 05 Aug 2014 15:45 |
| Last Modified: | 15 Sep 2023 23:32 |
| URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/58680 |
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