Recruitment and selection in organizations

Alonso, Ricardo (2014) Recruitment and selection in organizations. USC Marshall School of Business Research Paper Series. University of Southern California, Marshall School of Business, Los Angeles, CA, USA.

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Abstract

This paper studies employer recruitment and selection of job applicants when productivity is match-specific. Job-seekers have private, noisy assessments of their match value and the firm performs noisy interviews. Job-seekers' willingness to undergo a costly hiring process will depend both on the wage paid and on the perceived likelihood of being hired, while a noisy interview leads the firm to consider the quality of the applicant pool when setting hiring standards. I characterize job-seekers' equilibrium application decision as well as the firm's equilibrium wage and hiring rule. I show that changes in the informativeness of job-seekers assessments, or changes in the informativeness of the firm's interview, affect the size and composition of the applicant pool, and can raise hiring costs when it dissuades applications. As a result, the firm may actually favor noisier interviews, or prefer to face applicants that are less certain of their person-job/organization fit.

Item Type:	Monograph (Discussion Paper)
Official URL:	http://www.marshall.usc.edu/
Additional Information:	© 2014 The Author, USC Marshall School of Business
Divisions:	Management
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor > HD28 Management. Industrial Management
JEL classification:	D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information L - Industrial Organization > L2 - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior > L23 - Organization of Production
Date Deposited:	05 Aug 2014 15:01
Last Modified:	15 Sep 2023 23:32
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/58673

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