Items where Author is "Nava, Francesco"

Article

Nava, Francesco ORCID: 0009-0008-9593-3650, Margoni, Francesco, Herath, Nilmini and Nava, Elena (2023) Age-dependent changes in intuitive and deliberative cooperation. Scientific Reports, 13 (1). ISSN 2045-2322

Nava, Francesco ORCID: 0009-0008-9593-3650 and Schiraldi, Pasquale ORCID: 0000-0003-2469-1734 (2019) Differentiated durable goods monopoly: a robust Coase conjecture. American Economic Review, 109 (5). pp. 1930-1968. ISSN 0002-8282

Elliott, Matt and Nava, Francesco ORCID: 0009-0008-9593-3650 (2019) Decentralized bargaining in matching markets: efficient stationary equilibria and the core. Theoretical Economics, 14 (1). pp. 211-251. ISSN 1933-6837

Nava, Francesco ORCID: 0009-0008-9593-3650 (2015) Efficiency in decentralized oligopolistic markets. Journal of Economic Theory, 157. pp. 315-348. ISSN 0022-0531

Nava, Francesco ORCID: 0009-0008-9593-3650 and Schiraldi, Pasquale ORCID: 0000-0003-2469-1734 (2014) Sales and collusion in a market with storage. Journal of the European Economic Association, 12 (3). pp. 791-832. ISSN 1542-4766

Nava, Francesco ORCID: 0009-0008-9593-3650 and Piccione, Michele (2014) Efficiency in repeated games with local interaction and uncertain local monitoring. Theoretical Economics, 9 (1). pp. 279-312. ISSN 1933-6837

Schiraldi, Pasquale ORCID: 0000-0003-2469-1734 and Nava, Francesco ORCID: 0009-0008-9593-3650 (2012) Resale and collusion in a dynamic market for semidurable goods. Journal of Industrial Economics, 60 (2). pp. 274-298. ISSN 0022-1821

Book Section

Nava, Francesco ORCID: 0009-0008-9593-3650 (2016) Repeated games and networks. In: Bramoullé, Yann, Galeotti, Andrea and Rogers, Brian, (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of the Economics of Networks. Oxford handbooks. Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK. ISBN 9780199948277

Monograph

Nava, Francesco ORCID: 0009-0008-9593-3650 and Schiraldi, Pasquale ORCID: 0000-0003-2469-1734 (2013) Sales and collusion in a market with storage. . London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.

Nava, Francesco ORCID: 0009-0008-9593-3650 and Piccione, Michele (2012) Efficiency in repeated games with local interaction and uncertain local monitoring. . London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.

Nava, Francesco ORCID: 0009-0008-9593-3650 and Piccione, Michele (2011) Efficiency in repeated two-action games with local monitoring. Theoretical Economics (TE/2012/560). Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, London, UK.

Nava, Francesco ORCID: 0009-0008-9593-3650 (2009) Quantity competition in networked markets outflow and inflow competition. Theoretical Economics (TE/2009/542). Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, London, UK.

Nava, Francesco ORCID: 0009-0008-9593-3650 (2006) Sales and collusion in a market with storage. Discussion Paper (TE/2011/549). Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, London, UK.