Efficiency in decentralized oligopolistic markets

Nava, Francesco (2015) Efficiency in decentralized oligopolistic markets. Journal of Economic Theory, 157. pp. 315-348. ISSN 0022-0531

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Abstract

The paper analyzes quantity competition in economies in which a network describes the set of feasible trades. A model is presented in which the identity of buyers, of sellers, and of intermediaries is endogenously determined by the trade flows in the economy. The analysis first considers small economies, and provides sufficient conditions for equilibrium existence, a characterization of prices and flows, and some negative results relating welfare to network structure. The second and central part of the analysis considers behavior in large markets, and presents necessary and sufficient conditions on the network structure for equilibria to be approximately efficient when the number of players is large.

Item Type:	Article
Official URL:	http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/00220...
Additional Information:	© 2015 Elsevier Inc.
Divisions:	Economics
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
JEL classification:	C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory D - Microeconomics > D6 - Welfare Economics D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D85 - Network Formation and Analysis: Theory L - Industrial Organization > L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance > L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Date Deposited:	08 May 2015 13:34
Last Modified:	05 Apr 2024 06:03
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/61879

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