Ke, Rongzhu, Li, Jin and Powell, Michael (2018) Managing careers in organizations. Journal of Labor Economics, 36 (1). 197 - 252. ISSN 0734-306X
Full text not available from this repository.Abstract
Firms’ organizational structures impose constraints on their ability to use promotion-based incentives. We develop a framework for identifying these constraints and exploring their consequences. We show that firms manage workers’ careers by choosing personnel policies that resemble an internal labor market. Firms may adopt forced-turnover policies to keep lines of advancement open, and they may alter their organizational structures to relax these constraints. This gives rise to a trade-off between incentive provision at the worker level and productive efficiency at the firm level. Our framework generates novel testable implications that connect firm-level characteristics with workers’ careers.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/toc/jole/current |
| Additional Information: | © 2017 University of Chicago Press |
| Divisions: | Management |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor > HD28 Management. Industrial Management |
| Date Deposited: | 10 Oct 2017 16:32 |
| Last Modified: | 22 Nov 2024 02:09 |
| URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/84564 |
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