Fong, Yuk-fai, Li, Jin and Liu, Ke (2016) When does aftermarket monopolization soften foremarket competition? Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 25 (4). pp. 852-879. ISSN 1058-6407
Full text not available from this repository.Abstract
This paper investigates firms' abilities to tacitly collude when they each monopolize a proprietary aftermarket. When firms' aftermarkets are completely isolated from foremarket competition, they cannot tacitly collude more easily than single-product firms. However, when their aftermarket power is contested by foremarket competition as equipment owners view new equipment as a substitute for their incumbent firm's aftermarket product, profitable tacit collusion is sustainable among a larger number of firms. Conditions under which introduction of aftermarket competition hinders firms' ability to tacitly collude are characterized.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | http://doi.org/10.1111/jems.12167 |
| Additional Information: | © 2016 John Wiley & Sons |
| Divisions: | Management |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor > HD28 Management. Industrial Management |
| Date Deposited: | 10 Oct 2017 16:12 |
| Last Modified: | 12 Dec 2024 01:19 |
| URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/84559 |
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