How pseudo-hypotheses defeat a non-Bayesian theory of evidence: reply to Bandyopadhyay, Taper, and Brittan

Howson, Colin (2017) How pseudo-hypotheses defeat a non-Bayesian theory of evidence: reply to Bandyopadhyay, Taper, and Brittan. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 30 (3). pp. 299-306. ISSN 0269-8595

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Abstract

Bandyopadhyay, Taper, and Brittan (BTB) advance a measure of evidential support that first appeared in the statistical and philosophical literature four decades ago and have been extensively discussed since. I have argued elsewhere, however, that it is vulnerable to a simple counterexample. BTB claim that the counterexample is flawed because it conflates evidence with confirmation. In this reply, I argue that the counterexample stands, and is fatal to their theory.

Item Type:	Article
Official URL:	http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/cisp20/current
Additional Information:	© 2017 Open Society Foundation
Divisions:	LSE
Subjects:	B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General) Q Science > Q Science (General)
Date Deposited:	18 Sep 2017 08:54
Last Modified:	14 Sep 2024 07:31
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/84235

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