Condorcet meets Ellsberg

Ellis, Andrew ORCID: 0000-0002-7552-4832 (2016) Condorcet meets Ellsberg. Theoretical Economics, 11 (3). pp. 865-895. ISSN 1933-6837

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Abstract

The Condorcet Jury Theorem states that given subjective expected utility maximization and common values, the equilibrium probability that the correct candidate wins goes to one as the size of the electorate goes to infinity. This paper studies strategic voting when voters have pure common values but may be ambiguity averse -- exhibit Ellsberg-type behavior -- as modeled by maxmin expected utility preferences. It provides sufficient conditions so that the equilibrium probability of the correct candidate winning the election is bounded above by one half in at least one state. As a consequence, there is no equilibrium in which information aggregates.

Item Type:	Article
Official URL:	http://econtheory.org/
Additional Information:	© 2016 The Author © CC BY NC 3.0
Divisions:	Economics
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
JEL classification:	D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D81 - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
Date Deposited:	07 Dec 2015 09:12
Last Modified:	17 Oct 2024 17:18
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/64598

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