Spectrum auctions: greed is good… if you do it well!

Dütting, Paul, Gkatzelis, Vasillis and Roughgarden, Tim (2015) Spectrum auctions: greed is good… if you do it well! In: LSE Research Festival 2015, 2015-05-21, London, United Kingdom, GBR.

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Abstract

We devise a new auction mechanism for combinatorial auctions, such as the upcoming “incentive auctions” for re-allocating spectrum rights. Our mechanism achieves optimal social welfare subject to computability, and possesses an impressive list of incentive properties.

Item Type:	Conference or Workshop Item (Poster)
Additional Information:	© 2015 The Authors
Divisions:	Mathematics
Subjects:	Q Science > QA Mathematics
Date Deposited:	03 Aug 2015 16:16
Last Modified:	13 Sep 2024 14:14
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/62912

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