Dütting, Paul, Gkatzelis, Vasillis and Roughgarden, Tim (2015) Spectrum auctions: greed is good… if you do it well! In: LSE Research Festival 2015, 2015-05-21, London, United Kingdom.
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Abstract
We devise a new auction mechanism for combinatorial auctions, such as the upcoming “incentive auctions” for re-allocating spectrum rights. Our mechanism achieves optimal social welfare subject to computability, and possesses an impressive list of incentive properties.
| Item Type: | Conference or Workshop Item (Poster) |
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| Additional Information: | © 2015 The Authors |
| Divisions: | Mathematics |
| Subjects: | Q Science > QA Mathematics |
| Date Deposited: | 03 Aug 2015 16:16 |
| Last Modified: | 15 Sep 2023 08:33 |
| URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/62912 |
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