Kelemen, R. Daniel and Teo, Terence (2014) U.S. politicians adhere to balanced budget rules because they fear the bond markets, not judicial intervention. LSE American Politics and Policy (27 Aug 2014). Website.
|
PDF
- Published Version
Download (240kB) | Preview |
Abstract
In the wake of the European financial crisis, European Union (EU) leaders have reformed Eurozone governance to empower national and EU courts to enforce deficit and debt limits. In designing these reforms, policymakers drew lessons on balanced budget rules in U.S. states. But is the threat of court enforcement actually effective in ensuring balanced budgets in the states? In new research, R. Daniel Kelemen and Terence Teo find that despite their 170-year history, these judicial mechanisms are almost never enforced in court, and that they do not act as a deterrent to breaking budget rules for state officials. They argue instead, that clear balanced budget rules can act as a ‘red line’ for investors and bond markets, which, if broken, will act as a signal for them to punish sovereigns.
| Item Type: | Online resource (Website) |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/usappblog/ |
| Additional Information: | © 2014 The Author |
| Divisions: | LSE |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HJ Public Finance J Political Science > JK Political institutions (United States) |
| Date Deposited: | 05 Sep 2014 11:25 |
| Last Modified: | 13 Sep 2024 19:07 |
| URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/59396 |
Actions (login required)
 |
View Item |
Download Statistics
Download Statistics