Judgment aggregation without full rationality

Dietrich, Franz and List, Christian ORCID: 0000-0003-1627-800X (2008) Judgment aggregation without full rationality. Social Choice and Welfare, 31 (1). pp. 15-39. ISSN 0176-1714

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Abstract

Several recent results on the aggregation of judgments over logically connected propositions show that, under certain conditions, dictatorships are the only propositionwise aggregation functions generating fully rational (i.e., complete and consistent) collective judgments. A frequently mentioned route to avoid dictatorships is to allow incomplete collective judgments. We show that this route does not lead very far: we obtain oligarchies rather than dictatorships if instead of full rationality we merely require that collective judgments be deductively closed, arguably a minimal condition of rationality, compatible even with empty judgment sets. We derive several characterizations of oligarchies and provide illustrative applications to Arrowian preference aggregation and Kasher and Rubinstein’s group identification problem.

Item Type:	Article
Official URL:	http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100385
Additional Information:	© 2008 Springer
Divisions:	Government Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method CPNSS
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > H Social Sciences (General)
Date Deposited:	23 Jun 2008 08:22
Last Modified:	13 Sep 2024 22:34
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/5803

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